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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Farming is generally perceived to be a risky enterprise. The 
major sources of risk in farming are business and financial. Business 
risks include production, marketing and other risks of a farming 
enterprise, which are independent of how it is financed. Financial 
risks are due to the level of debt or method of financing. 
Various responses have been devised to mitigate business risk. 
They range from self-insurance to enterprise diversification, 
economies of size, adoption of new technology, hedging on the 
futures market, forward contracting, using agricultural commodity 
options and purchasing crop insurance. 
Crop insurance is an instrument that can reduce the risk of a 
short crop. It has existed in one form or another since colonial times. 
Over the years, private insurance companies tried to offer a variety 
of protection programs, which would protect farmers against the 
adverse financial impacts of lower yields. While the companies' crop 
hail/fire protection programs have been successful, their multiple-
peril coverage has not. The multiple-peril programs suffered from 
low participation levels and the fact that small companies did not 
have adequate financial strength to survive widespread losses. 
In 1938, the U.S. Government became directly involved in the 
business of insuring farmers against crop losses by passing 
legislation which authorized the establishment of the Federal Crop 
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Insurance Corporation (FCIC). Although referred to as "all risk" 
insurance, the federal crop insurance program actually insured few 
crops against specific perils. This shortcoming contributed to the 
problem of low participation for both private and government crop 
insurance programs. The number of perils covered by federal crop 
insurance programs gradually increased, but the problem of low 
participation has not been resolved. To encourage voluntary crop 
insurance as a primary government program to replace government 
crop disaster payments, the Federal Crop Insurance (FCI) Act of 1980 
tried to increase the attractiveness of crop insurance by subsidizing 
farmers' purchases of multiple-peril crop insurance (MPCI). 
The legislative response of Congress to the drought of 1986, 
and more importantly the 1988 drought, brought the controversy of 
the subsidized MPCI program versus the disaster assistance program 
back to the forefront of the 1990 Farm Bill debate. 
Government crop disaster payments, introduced in the 1970s, 
had become a significant federal expenditure by the end of the 
1980s. During fiscal years 1980-1988, the total cost of agricultural 
disaster assistance had been estimated to be $17.6 billion (GAO, 
1989). These costs were divided between three programs: crop 
insurance ($4.3 billion), disaster payments ($6.9 billion), and 
emergency loans ($6.4 billion). Despite the executive and 
congressional branches' repeated and concerted effort to convince 
farmers that Federal Disaster Relief programs would be replaced by 
federally subsidized crop insurance programs, the government 
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continued to provide disaster relief payments to disaster stricken 
farmers as recently as for the 1991 crop year. 
Beyond the budgetary concerns, arguments have been 
expressed that the simultaneous or potential offering of disaster 
assistance prevents MPCI from serving as an effective disaster relief 
mechanism for farmers. The concluding presumption is that one or 
the other of the programs should be continued, but not both. As a 
result, there is a need to clarify the actual impact of disaster 
assistance on producers' decisions and attitudes towards MPCI. 
Extensive economic modeling has been done on the producers' 
MPCI purchase decisions. This study adds to the body of knowledge 
by examining a multivariate regression approach to determine the 
relationship between the two types of disaster relief as well as other 
factors that affect farmers' decisions to purchase multiple-peril crop 
insurance. This study is unique in that it analyzes actual producer 
MPCI purchase decisions after a severe crop disaster and the passage 
of a major disaster assistance program. Furthermore, this study 
avoids a major drawback of other studies that utilize the expected 
utility hypothesis, where the results depend heavily upon the 
assumed risk attitudes implied by the assumed utility function. 
Because the federal government has had a long history of 
providing various programs and policy instruments for use by 
farmers. Chapter 2 will first review the historical background of the 
evolution of the multiple-peril crop insurance program and the 
recent literature concerning the crop insurance program. In Chapter 
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3, a conceptual relationship between a crop insurance purchase 
decision and various exogenous variables will be put forward. It is 
assumed that the various indicators and exogenous variables are the 
underlying reason for a farmer to make a choice to obtain crop 
insurance. A step function will then translate the decision making 
process into a probability statement. Three models, one linear and 
the others nonlinear, will be developed and will examine the 
behavior of Iowa farmers with regard to the purchase of multiple-
peril crop insurance. Chapter 4 will discuss the data that was used in 
this study, which was available from the 1 989 Iowa Farm Finance 
Survev. Each variable will be defined, and their possible effects on 
the purchase of crop insurance will be hypothesized. In Chapter 5, 
the empirical results of each model will be discussed and compared 
with one another. Finally, Chapter 6 will interpret the findings, while 
conclusions and suggestions for future research will be presented in 
Chapter 7. 
CHAPTER 2. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Historical background 
Prior to the 1930s, government assistance provided to farmers 
was designed to improve the efficiency of producing and marketing 
farm products. Congress's indirect approach to improve the farming 
sector took different forms, including the establishment of the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the extension service, 
as well as land-grant colleges and agricultural experiment stations 
(Kramer, 1988). 
However, following two serious price depressions. Congress 
shifted to an approach which included direct government 
involvement in the agricultural commodity market. In 1933, the 
Commodity Credit Corporation was established and was designed to 
help farmers with price supports for some farm products. Under this 
program, nonrecourse loans were made to cotton and corn farmers 
and provided borrowers with a price floor for their products. Later, 
this program was merged with the idea of some type of crop 
insurance which would effectively stabilize grain prices and supplies 
(Kramer, 1988). 
Severe droughts in 1934 and 1936 generated interest in the 
idea of federal crop insurance. In February, 1937, President 
Roosevelt's Committee on Crop Insurance released a report wherein 
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they recommended the establishment of a federal crop insurance 
program which would be administered by the USDA. Under this 
plan, farmers would insure some percentage of their average yield 
and the premiums would be calculated based on a weighted average 
of the loss experience of individual farmers as well as the county or 
area. Although no other country had attempted to provide this type 
of protection, President Roosevelt encouraged crop insurance 
legislation which was designed to shift much of the farmer's risk 
burden to the general public 
On February 16, 1938, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was 
enacted. Title V of this Act established the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC), which represented the government's first attempt 
to provide nationwide "all-risk" or multiple-peril crop insurance. 
Although limited crop insurance had been available through private 
insurers for several years, no private company had successfully 
offered insurance which would protect farmers from a variety of 
natural disasters. (Kramer, 1988). 
During the first year, nearly one-third of the farmers insured 
by the FCIC collected indemnities, and total indemnities exceeded 
premiums by 2.6 million bushels. This loss was attributed to severe 
droughts suffered in several states, to the late completion of wheat 
contracts which resulted in adverse selection and to administrative 
problems which were believed to have underestimated the yield 
variability of individual farmers (FCIC, 1939). 
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In 1944, an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 was passed that expanded the list of insurable risks to include 
losses resulting from rain, snow, frost, fire, wildlife and hurricane 
effects. In addition, the program was expanded to cover a number of 
experimental programs for commodities including corn, beans, oats, 
barley and rye. This amendment also allowed the FCIC to refuse to 
sell insurance to farmers in high-risk areas (Kramer, 1988). 
Between 1945 and 1949, the crop insurance program went 
through a number of changes, including a progressive protection 
plan, whereby protection increased as the crops progressed during 
the growing season. However, crop protection was reduced when the 
FCIC recognized that the insured crop was damaged or destroyed 
early in the growing season and it was too late to be replanted. This 
change was designed to eliminate the possibility of a farmer profiting 
more by incurring a crop loss than by harvesting a successful crop. 
In addition, a three-year contract was introduced in an effort to 
reduce the cost of selling the insurance and to avoid the problem of 
adverse selection, which was inherent under a one-year contract. 
During the early 1950s, droughts illustrated the benefits of the 
crop insurance program. Beginning in 1956, the issue of overlap 
between federal crop insurance and other government programs was 
raised by the FCIC. At a time when Congress was authorizing 
disaster assistance in the forms of reserve programs, livestock feed 
assistance and emergency credit, the FCIC argued before Congress 
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that crop insurance should be the only form of disaster assistance 
available to farmers. (FCIC, 1956). 
Over a five-year period beginning in 1957, insurance 
premiums exceeded indemnities every year, which allowed the 
program to expand its coverage of existing crops as well as add 
additional crops. In 1962 and 1963, coverage was extended to a 
maximum of three crops per year. In the 1970s, with disaster 
payments supplementing older loans, as well as feed and seed 
programs, emphasis on relief programs shifted from loans to direct 
payments. This action raised the cost of drought aid and reduced the 
incentive for farmers to buy crop insurance (Dyson, 1988). 
In 1977, the GAO proposed individualized protection as a 
means of increasing individual participation in the federal crop 
insurance program. It suggested that protection based on individual 
experience would be more equitable to farmers and would sharply 
increase participation among low-risk producers who would enjoy 
higher coverage and/or lower premiums. It was believed that 
greater participation by low-risk producers would improve the 
financial operations of the FCIC and reduce adverse selectivity. 
In 1977, the Food and Agricultural Act was passed, effectively 
renewing the disaster payment programs. Although the disaster 
payments were popular with farmers because it was provided at no 
cost and covered high-risk areas where crop insurance was 
unavailable, this program was criticized on the grounds that it 1) 
encouraged farmers to plant in high-risk areas, 2) encouraged some 
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farmers to collect payments rather than risk a crop failure when the 
planting conditions were less than ideal, and 3) allowed farmers to 
insure against losses caused by mismanagement (Kramer, 1988). 
The turning point in the development of the MPCI program 
came in 1980 with the passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act. 
This act expanded the crop insurance program by eliminating annual 
expansion limits, expanding the area where the crop insurance would 
be available and allowing farmers to reduce their FCIC premiums if 
they retained private hail and fire coverage through other sources 
(which resolved a longstanding dispute between private insurers 
who saw the hail and fire coverage under the federal program as an 
unfair form of competition [Kramer, 1988]). As a result of the 1980 
legislation, most disaster payments were eliminated after 1981 and 
the attractiveness of crop insurance was expected to increase as 30 
percent of the farmers' premiums were subsidized. However, no 
more than approximately 20 percent of the farmers bought crop 
insurance between 1980 and 1987 (Dyson, 1988). 
Prior to 1985, farmers could only insure their crop yields up to 
a limit calculated as the mean yield for the county in which the 
farmer operated. This system, which was known as the Area Yield 
Plan resulted in adverse selection because a farmer with a historical 
yield less than the area yield could obtain coverage which was 
greater than his/her own expected yield. In contrast, farmers whose 
historical yield exceeded the area yield were reluctant to participate 
because they could only insure their yield up to the area yield. 
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Consequently, occurrence of adverse selection reduced the 
marketability of MPCI (Toland, 1988). 
In 1985, in an effort to reduce the problem of adverse 
selection, the FCIC began using a farmer's historical yield records to 
determine the farmer's insurable yield. This procedure, known as 
Actual Production History (APH), was designed to create a direct 
relationship between the farmer's production history and insurance 
guarantees and rates (Kramer, 1988). 
Despite previous efforts to eliminate disaster assistance 
payments, in response to the drought of 1986 Congress passed 
disaster payment legislation that cost $634 million. However, the 
1986 disaster program was not an exception to the rule when one 
considers that the 1988 drought relief package cost $3.85 billion. 
The ad hoc government disaster relief programs have reinforced the 
belief that farmers can sometimes count on the government to 
impose disaster payments if and when serious disasters occur 
(Dyson, 1988). 
2.2 Review of literature 
One of the goals of the 1980 PCI Act was to make MPCI the 
primary government-subsidized crop disaster program. 
Accomplishing this goal required substantial participation in the 
MPCI program. Kramer (1983) noted that after the FCIC incurred 
large net indemnity losses with MPCI during 1938-1947, Congress 
subsequently scaled back its intention of having MPCI serve as a 
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major farm program. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1977) and 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 1978) studies determined that 
limitations, which had been placed on the program, prevented MPCI 
from serving as an effective disaster relief mechanism for producers. 
For example, many producers were not able to insure their crops 
simply because no MPCI program was available in their county. 
In addition, prior to 1980, private insurers provided limited 
income protection against hail and fire, whereas MPCI covered these 
perils as well as numerous others. However, farmers were not given 
the option of purchasing MPCI without hail and fire coverage (AACI, 
1987). Private insurers who sold hail and fire crop insurance 
considered MPCI's overlapping coverage of these perils to be 
subsidized competition (Kramer, 1983: Kramer, 1988). 
The FCI Act of 1980 responded to these shortcomings by 
extending MPCI's coverage to as many crops and areas as possible. 
In addition, the FCI Act allowed a producer to drop the hail and fire 
coverage from an MPCI policy, but required that he/she then 
purchase an equivalent dollar amount of hail and fire coverage 
through other sources (Toland, 1988). 
The FCI Act of 1980 also established a subsidy, not to exceed 
30 percent of a producer's MPCI premium, in order to encourage 
greater participation in the MPCI program. Gardner and Kramer 
(1982) estimated that a 50 percent premium subsidy was needed to 
attract a majority of the U.S. crop acreage into MPCI. Lemieux, 
Richardson and Nixon (1983) simulated MPCI use for Texas cotton 
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and grain sorghum farms. They found that, at a 30 percent subsidy, 
farmers would purchase MPCI, covering 50 and 65 percent of their 
yield. They predicted that MPCI would not be purchased for the 75 
percent yield coverage level when the 30 percent subsidy was 
discontinued above the 65 percent level. The need for premium 
subsidies was also concluded by Nieuwoudt et al. (1985), in order for 
the insurance system to have a sizeable impact on income 
stabilization. 
Hojjati and Bockstael (1988) tried to explore factors that affect 
a farmer's decision to participate in the crop insurance program. 
They argued that participation in crop insurance is interrelated with 
other decisions. These researchers constructed a model of farmers 
demand for crop insurance which also considered the crop 
diversification (acreage allocation) choices available to the farmers. 
Using the concept of expected utility, with utility being a function of 
profit and the variance of profit, this model suggested that any 
changes in the FCIC policy which increases the expected profit and 
reduces variance of profits would increase the rate of participation in 
the crop insurance program. Hojjati and Bockstael (1988) also 
concluded that the increased participation may lead to changes in the 
crop mix in areas where diversification was used as a risk managing 
tool. 
The participation of farmers in crop insurance programs, as 
well as other government programs, was also studied by Mapp and 
Jeter (1988). They used a computer simulation model developed by 
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Hardin (1978) and Hardin and Walker (1978) to simulate the 
performance of a low-equity, southwest Oklahoma farm over a ten-
year period. These researchers analyzed capital investments in a 
stochastic environment under various assumptions regarding 
participation in government commodity and crop insurance 
programs. Among the many findings, this study suggested that, 
evaluated in terms of ending net worth and the coefficient of 
variation of ending net worth, participation in the federal crop 
insurance program was generally not a very attractive alternative 
for the Oklahoma farmer. A combination of Disaster-Deficiency 
payment programs achieved the highest ending net worth and lowest 
coefficient of variation of ending net worth. Overall, this study 
suggested that low participation in federal crop insurance programs 
in southwest Oklahoma may be partially explained by high 
premiums relative to indemnities (Mapp and Jeter, 1988). 
Toland (1988) studied a producer's MPCI purchase decision 
using an Expected Utility Hypothesis (EUH) model. His model was 
partially based on the derivations for decision making with insurance 
presented by Robison and Barry (1987). Among other things, Toland 
found that producers' management skills could be just as important 
as the soil type in determining insurable yield for the purchase of 
MPCI. He also concluded that the group of medium yield producers 
would need additional incentives to participate in the MPCI program. 
Finally, if their initial net equity position was medium to high, 
producers were not predicted to buy MPCI at any mean yields. This 
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result implied that MPCI had the potential to primarily attract 
producers who were in a weak financial position (Toland, 1988). 
In a study of the effects of crop insurance prices on financially 
stressed farms, Skees and Nutt (1988) contended that studies 
evaluating the effects of crop insurance on the risk of farming 
without evaluating the farm level loss ratios (i.e., expected 
indemnities divided by expected premiums) were inappropriate. 
They argued that farm level risks were not the same for all farmers 
within a specified area. In addition, premium rates offered by FCIC 
were not structured using facts from typical farms. Instead, the 
rates were developed from a group of farms which were adversely 
selected over time (i.e., farmers in higher yield risk areas who 
typically purchased more crop insurance than farmers in lower yield 
risk areas). Skees and Nutt (1988) argued that a generalization 
about the effects of crop insurance, which did not consider the loss 
ratios, could be misleading. 
As an alternative, these researchers developed loss ratios and 
then studied how crop insurance could provide risk protection for 
the sample farmers in a multi-year analysis (Skees and Nutt, 1988). 
By comparing measures of wealth for different risk environments, 
they showed that when the insurance was priced at break-even 
levels (i.e., expected loss ratio = 1.0), there were positive gains in the 
mean value of generated wealth. However, under an expected loss 
ratio of .8, their study suggested that in most risk environments cash 
flow drains from the purchase of crop insurance would lead to 
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limited financial stress. For loss ratios of .6 and .4, their study 
showed reductions in generated wealth for every case where crop 
insurance was purchased. Skees and Nutt's (1988) study concluded 
that although purchasing crop insurance may periodically protect 
farmers from yield losses, it is possible that the expense of 
purchasing crop insurance, depending on how the insurance is priced, 
drains the farmer more than the protection provides in years of crop 
loss. 
The use of loss ratios in determining crop insurance premiums 
and production guarantee levels had also been suggested by King 
(1984). As previously noted, in response to the shortcomings 
associated with Area Yield plan coverage, the FCIC established 
procedures using individual yields to attract more producers, 
especially those whose mean crop yields were greater than or equal 
to the area mean yield. As an alternative. King (1984) proposed the 
Target Loss Ratio (TLR) procedure. Under this approach, individual 
historical data was used to adjust premiums or production 
guarantees such that the expected loss ratio equaled a pre-specified 
target value. Although King's findings were preliminary, he 
concluded that premium and production guarantee level adjustments 
using TLR procedures should result in a crop insurance program 
which is more attractive to farmers than the present government 
program (King, 1984). 
Harper, Williams and Barnaby (1989) analyzed the selection of 
crop insurance yield guarantee levels and indemnity prices based on 
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risk preference for corn/soybean farmers in Northeastern Kansas. 
They found that some level of crop insurance will be purchased by 
all but the most risk-preferring producers. For risk-averse 
producers, the highest yield guarantee level and indemnity price are 
preferred. Further, the effect of the availability of disaster aid 
programs like those in force in 1988 was to negate the incentives to 
purchase crop insurance for all but the most risk-averse producers 
(Harper et al., 1989). 
2.1 Problem statement and studv objectives 
A review of the literature concerning risks and crop insurance 
indicates that the application of the Expected Utility Hypothesis 
(EUH) has been a major analytical tool in many of the studies. The 
EUH approach has been regarded as useful and acceptable in dealing 
with decision making under uncertainty (Hirshleifer and Riley, 
1979). Researchers found that EUH models would better predict the 
actual producer behavior than would the profit maximization 
approach (Officer and Halter, 1968; Lin, Dean and Moore, 1974; 
SriRamaratnam et al., 1987). However, despite its widely regarded 
usefulness and acceptance, there has not been universal acceptance 
of EUH as the basis for risk analysis. Linearity in probabilities, 
transitivity of preferences and subjective probability formulation 
were all aspects of the EUH approach, which were challenged in 
earlier research (Allais, 1953; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Payne 
and Braunstein, 1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
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The review of literature on crop insurance also indicates that 
researchers often utilize the underlying theories of utility and profit 
(or cost) in their extreme abstract theoretical forms. For example, in 
using the Expected Utility Hypothesis approach, one or two 
independent variables (often income and variance or the coefficient 
of variation of income) are used to perform the analysis. Although a 
theory by definition requires abstraction, excluding other relevant 
factors from the analysis may give a distorted view of the real world. 
Furthermore, in the study of behavior under risk, the risk attitude 
by definition is measured by the bending rate of the utility function. 
As such, the results of these studies heavily depend upon the form of 
the assumed utility function. 
The present federal crop insurance program has been 
characterized by low farmer participation and high government 
costs. It has been frequently argued that one of the major factors 
causing the poor participation rate is the continued availability of 
disaster relief payments, whereby the ad hoc disaster assistance 
programs help support producers' beliefs that a widespread natural 
disaster will be accompanied by government assistance. 
Using a multivariate regression approach, this study intends to 
empirically identify factors that are relevant to farmers' decisions to 
participate in government crop insurance programs. In addition, this 
study will explore the validity of the argument that disaster 
assistance negates the need for crop insurance. In this study, a 
utility driven model is developed for the decision between 
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purchasing or not purchasing crop insurance. However, unlike a 
standard EUH approach, decisions are not based on any comparison 
of the expected utility values. Indeed, the utility function in the 
models, which will be described in the next chapter, are not explicit. 
Finally, the results of this study will enable researchers and 
practitioners to predict the likelihood of Iowa farmers' participation 
in federal crop insurance programs under a variety of circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The risk attitude, along with the decision maker's perceptions 
(i.e., expectations) of the amount of risk, are two of the basic 
behavioral components of decision theory. In this study, both linear 
and nonlinear probability models will be used to examine possible 
relationships between crop insurance purchase decisions and the 
indicators of risk and risk preferences. 
^•1 Theoretical framework 
The conceptual relationship between a crop insurance purchase 
decision and exogenous variables influencing the decision is based on 
a formal, rational choice hypothesis that was proposed by Luce and 
Suppes (1965), among others. McFadden (1973) expanded upon the 
concept by applying econometric modeling. 
The rational choice hypothesis asserts that if individual iis 
given a choice of selecting between two alternatives, he/she will 
demonstrate his/her preference over these two alternatives by 
selecting the most prefered option (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). 
According to this approach, if we let indicate individual i's 
preference for alternative one and let denote i's preference for 
alternative two, then individual i would choose alternative one over 
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alternative two if > U.g, and would choose alternative two over 
one if Uj2 > U^. 
The U. terms (and the Y/ that will be defined later) are 
interval level variables which are not observed or measured and in 
fact may not be observable because of their nature. These terms 
may be interpreted as utility, as was previously done by Toland 
(1988), Nelson and Loehman (1987) and Graze m et al. (1988). 
Furthermore, preference may be assumed to be a linear 
function of exogenous variables (to be defined later): 
where for k = 1 k are the exogenous variables; e/s are the 
disturbance terms capturing any unmeasured factors, approximation 
errors, and random factors: a^^'s are unknown constants: and the 
subscripts il and 12 refer, respectively, to choices 1 and 2 available 
to individual i. 
Also, let Y.* define the difference between the two preferences: 
^ ^ kl ^ik ^ 
and ( 1 )  
( 2 )  
by substituting equation ( 1 ) for and U.^ we will obtain: 
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V = ~ Ui2 = 2: (&%! - a^g) Xik + (e,! - ^ 12^- (3) 
We can simplify (3) by letting bj^ = (a^i - a^g) and w. = (e^^ - e.j), 
which will result in: 
V - Z b , X i , - w ,  ( 4 )  
By definition, if individual i chooses alternative one over alternative 
two, it would mean that > U.^, which according to (2) would mean 
that Y.* > 0; and according to (4) would mean that S b^X^^ - w. > 0. In 
other words, alternative one is chosen when w. < Zb^X.,^. 
If a variable Y. is defined as an observed indicator of the choice 
made by individual i, such that: 
Yj = 1 when alternative one is chosen, (i.e., when Y.* > 0) 
Y. = 0 when alternative two is chosen, (i.e., when Y/ < 0) 
then, we are led to a probabilistic statement that; 
P(Y. = 1) = P(Y; > 0) = P(w. <Eb^X.J (5) 
where P(Y. = 1 ) symbolizes the probability that Y. equals one; and 
P(Y.* > 0) denotes the probability that Y.* is greater than zero. 
Equation (5) suggests that to estimate P(Y. = 1 ), we need to know the 
total (or cumulative) probability that Wj is less than Z b^^X.^^. If we 
further simplify the above statement by defining: 
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\ - ( 6 )  
and assume w. is a continuous random variable with a probability 
density function of f(w), then (5) could be rewritten as: 
where F(Z.) is the cumulative distribution function of the random 
variable w. (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). 
Thus, the probability that alternative one is chosen, P(Y. = 1 ), 
not only depends upon the magnitude of Z. which, in turn, is a linear 
function of the exogenous variables, but also depends upon the 
distribution of Wj yet to be specified. If we assume, for example, 
that w. is uniformly distributed such that the corresponding 
cumulative distribution function is in a simple linear functional form: 
P(Yj= l) = P(w.<Ib^Xj^) 
= P(w. < Z.) 
=_^J^f(w)dw 
= F(ZJ 
(7) 
0 if 0 >Z 
F(Z.) Z if 1 > Z > 0 (8) 
1 if Z>1 
then the probability that alternative one is chosen, P(Yj = 1 ), is also a 
linear function of the same exogenous variables as is the variable Z. 
(i.e., P(Y. = 1 ) = Zj = Sbj^Xjj^). Whereas, if we assume that w. follows a 
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logistic distribution, then the cumulative distribution function (7) 
will be in the form of: 
e'^ 
P(Y. = 1) = (9) 
1 + e^' 
That is, the probability that alternative one is chosen is a nonlinear 
(logistic) function of Z., which, in turn, is a linear function of the 
exogenous variables. Finally, if we assume that w. follows a normal 
distribution, we will end up with a cumulative normal function for 
P(Y. = 1 ): 
rz J 
P(Y. = 1) = F(Zi) = ' e("^i/2)dw.. (10) 1 
2\] 
Unfortunately, this integration cannot be carried out in closed form 
and is rather cumbersome to write, but suffice to say that this would 
yield another case where P(Y. = 1) nonlinearly depends on Z.. 
3.2 Empirical models 
In this study, both linear and nonlinear probability (regression) 
models will be used to examine possible relationships between crop 
insurance purchase decisions and some exogenous factors affecting 
the decisions. In developing the models, the above equations (8,9 
and 10) have a practical implication: we can estimate the probability 
of purchasing crop insurance by using regression models with 
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dichotomous dependent variables (i.e., variables holding values of 
either zero or one). 
In the case of a linear regression, the model to be estimated 
will be in the form of: 
+ Ci ( 1 1 )  
where Y. = 1 when crop insurance is purchased , and 
= 0 when crop insurance is not purchased. 
X.J, for k = 1 k are the exogenous or 
independent variables affecting Y.. 
Ej is the deviation Y. from its expected 
value, otherwise known as error or 
disturbance term. 
are the population parameters to be 
estimated from sample information. 
The regression model (11) presumes that the means E(Y^) lies on a 
straight line (linear), known as the true (population) regression line: 
E(Y,) - n, . XP,X.,. (12)  
In addition, the model requires some basic assumptions about 
the distribution of the random variable Y., namely, that they have 
the same variance for all Xj and that they are statistically 
independent. 
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Since Y. equals either zero or one, the expected value of Y. 
equals the probability that Y. equals one: 
E(Y.) =  1  x P ( Y j =  1 )  +  0  ï P ( Y .  =  0 )  
= P(Y. = 1). (13) 
This implies that in the case of a dichotomous linear regression 
model where the dependent variable can assume only the values of 
zero or one (i.e., purchasing or not purchasing crop insurance), the 
model will also estimate the orobabiiitv that the dependent variable 
will assume a value of one: 
P(Y.= l) = %Xik + Gi (14) 
where P(Yj = 1) is the probability of purchasing crop insurance, X.^ 
for k = l,...,k are the exogenous variables affecting the purchasing 
decisions, are the parameters to be estimated, and E. are the error 
terms. 
In case of a nonlinear probability model, the choice hinges 
upon the distribution of the disturbance term w., as discussed 
earlier. However, among many well-known and not-so-well-known 
distributions that lead us to nonlinear probability models, logistic 
and normal distributions are, for a variety of reasons, the two most 
commonly used alternatives to the linear specification of the 
probability model (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). 
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Analogous to the linear case, equation (13) implies that the 
logistic distribution function of (9) could very well be interpreted as 
the underlying nonlinear regression model that attributes the 
probability of purchasing crop insurance to some exogenous 
variables. In short, the nonlinear model to be estimated will be in 
the form of: 
P(Y. = 1) = [1 + e -ZPkXikj-i + (15) 
where P, P, X, and £ are the same as defined in the linear model ( 14). 
Finally, the normal probability distribution function (10) will 
be used to estimate the probability of making decisions to purchase 
crop insurance based on some exogenous factors, as depicted below: 
rZ 
P(Y.= l) = F(Zj) = 
Chapter 4 will discuss some of the explanatory variables (X's) which 
are believed to be relevant to the process of crop insurance purchase 
decisions. 
Estimation procedures 
As a means of analyzing the dichotomized response to the 
purchase of crop insurance, both least-squares regression methods 
and the maximum likelihood approach are utilized. While least-
1 
e("^i/2)dWj.+8. (16) 
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squares techniques are relatively easy to apply and the 
interpretation of the results are straight forward, the maximum 
likelihood method is recognized by many as the appropriate method 
of regressing cases with a binary dependent variable. A brief 
summary of the procedures that were applied in this study will be 
presented below. 
3.3.1 Ordinarv Least-Sauares (OLS) procedure Least-squares 
procedures are used to estimate the linear probability model (14). 
This procedure requires some prerequisites concerning the values of 
the explanatory variables (Xj, for k = l,...,k) and the distribution of 
the error term e^. Namely, it is required that: 
1. The values of the explanatory variables in the model (14) 
be fixed and measured without error. 
2. The error terms are independent (from each other) 
random variables, all have a mean of zero, and all 
have the same constant variance (i.e., homoscedasticity). 
These requirements, as a result, impart randomness to the 
dependent variable Y. (or P(Y| = 1)) and imply that it has the same 
distribution as does 8.. 
Due to the inherent nature of the data used in this study (as 
will be discussed in the next chapter), the data may not display all of 
the desirable characteristics outlined above. However, due to the 
robustness of the procedure, it is believed that the benefits of using 
the least-squares procedure outweighs it's shortcomings . For 
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instance, the estimates obtained in this procedure will probably not 
be the best estimator (i.e., the most "efficient" estimator in the sense 
of having the least sampling variance), however, as will be discussed 
below, these estimators will still be unbiased and will produce very 
encouraging results in predicting the purchase of crop insurance in 
various senarios. 
^•^•2 Weighted Least-Sauares (WLSl procedure Goldberger 
(1964) has shown that one difficulty which arises when applying 
ordinary least squares, where the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, is that the assumption of homoscedastic disturbances is 
unattainable. This follows from the fact that the error term from 
equation (11), 
G. - Yr zPAk (17) 
can, in this case, only have two possible values: 
8i = 1 - if Y. = 1 
= - if Y. = 0. 
These two possible values of the error term will occur with 
probabilities P(Y. = 1) and P(Y. = 0), respectively, because of the 
binomial distribution of the response variable P(Y. = 0) = 1 - P(Y. = 1 ). 
As a result, it can be shown that the assumption of the error term 
having a mean of zero is maintained: 
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E(ep = P(Y. = 0) + P(Y. = 1)(1 -
= [1 - P(Y. = 1)] + [P(Yi = 1)] [1 - SP^X^J 
= 0. 
And thus, OLS estimates of Pj^ will be unbiased. Furthermore, the 
error variance can be written as: 
E(E. - E(e.))2 = P(Y. = 0) [- SPj^Xjj^ - E(epi2 + 
P(Y. = 1) [1 - ZPkXy^ - E(e.)]2 
Since E(8j) = 0 and P(Y. = 0) = 1 - P(Y. = 1 ) then: 
E(e.)2 = [ 1 - p(Y. = 1 )] [-Sp^Xj^l^ + P(Y. = 1 ) [ 1 - Sp^Xj 
= (ZPkX^)^ + P(Y. = 1) - 2P(Y.= l)(SP^Xi^). 
Since P(Y. = 1 ) = E(Yp = Ipj^Xj^, then: 
E(8i)2 - - (XP,Xi,)2. 
Clearly, the error variance is not a constant, but depends upon the 
value of the explanatory variables. The assumption of constant error 
variance, or homoscedasticity, is therefore violated. As a result, the 
OLS estimates, p^^, although unbiased, will not be "best" in the sense 
of being the minimum variance estimators of all linear unbiased 
estimators. 
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To correct this problem, Goldberger (1964) proposed a two-
step weighted estimation technique. By applying proper weights to 
the regression model, the transformed error terms would have 
constant variance and the estimators would not only be unbiased but 
"efficient" as well. The proper weights are the reciprocals of the 
estimated standard errors of the disturbances (Aldrich and Nelson, 
1984). 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) In view of the 
probability interpretation of the E(Yj) as shown in equation (13), the 
predicted values generated by the estimated model (11)(Y\ = 
where is the estimated parameters) are interpreted as predicted 
h A 
probabilities (i.e., Y. = P.). However, the probability is defined to lie 
A 
between zero and one, and the predicted values are 
unbounded and may be less than zero or greater than one (Wrigley, 
1976). 
A number of simple solutions, however, are available to tackle 
this problem. Given the fact that the probability estimates, even 
though unbiased, are still just estimates, one should expect some 
values to fall out of the range of zero to one simply due to sampling 
error. As such, this problem is not viewed to be necessarily severe, 
and as a practical solution one can truncate the estimates of to 
values close to zero or one. For example, .001 can be substituted for 
negative predicted values, while .999 can be substituted for 
predicted values which are estimated to be greater than one (Aldrich 
and Nelson, 1984). 
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The logistic probability distribution function (9) and the 
subsequent logit model (15) present another alternative solution to 
the above problem. As can be seen by comparing the models, the 
logistic probability function, unlike the linear specification, 
automatically satisfies the 0 - 1 boundary of P. Although there are 
other models which automatically satisfy the condition 0 ^ P < 1, 
logistic and normal functions are by far the most widely used. 
Although logistic and normal functions are nonlinear, they can 
be transformed into linear modelsi, where one can apply OLS to 
estimate the parameters. However, probit and logit parameters can 
be directly estimated through the method of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) without any need for transformation. It has been 
argued that the maximum likelihood logistic regression is preferred 
over the linear discriminant model because the logistic regression, 
unlike the linear model, is less restrictive and is applicable under a 
wide variety of assumptions about the explanatory variables. 
^ The linear transformation of the logistic model (15) is in the form of; 
logeP'/l-P'.Zp,X^. 
Another transformation, called the Probit transformation (Finney, 1971), 
will result in the linear equivalent of the normal function (16). Using the 
Probit regression, the model can be written as: 
Probit (P.) -t.-
where t. equals the normal equivalent deviate (NED), such that a proportion 
P. of the standard normal distribution falls to the left of NED, plus five to 
avoid negative values. That is: Probit (P.) - t. - NED + 5 (Wrigley, 1976). 
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including the case where some or all of the independent variables 
are dichotomous zero-one variables (Lines and Zulauf, 1985: 
Halperin, et al., 1971; and Anderson, 1972). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DATA 
The risk attitude, along with the decision maker's perceptions 
(i.e., expectations) of the amount of risk, are two of the basic 
behavioral components of decision theory. Although all the factors 
influencing those components are still the subject of debate among 
researchers, some socio-economic variables have been found to be 
significantly relevant in shaping one's risk attitude and risk 
perceptions. 
4,1 Rglgvant factors 
The risk attitudes of individual decision makers are said to be 
different among people because of the shape of their utility functions 
with respect to wealth or other monetary outcomes. Utilizing this 
concept, Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1963) independently theorized a 
measure of ordering decision makers according to their risk 
attitudes. The measure, known as the Absolute Risk Aversion 
Coefficient (ARAC), is defined as the negative of the ratio of the 
second to the first derivative of the utility function evaluated at the 
decision maker's wealth or income level, which, in fact, reflects the 
bending rate of the decision maker's utility function (Robison and 
Berry, 1987). 
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Prat and Arrow believed that the ARAC was a decreasing 
function of wealth and income. This implies that as the decision 
maker moves to a higher wealth level his/her attitude towards 
taking risk softens and becomes less risk-avert and, thus, the 
decision maker demands less compensation or reward for 
participating in a risky investment. 
The magnitude or perceptions of the amount of risk, on the 
other hand, is said to be determined by the investment's probability 
distribution, where the probabilities reflect the likelihood of 
occurrence for the respective outcomes. Since exact estimates of 
such distributions are difficult to obtain, researchers have commonly 
assumed that the expected value and variance of the probability 
distribution adequately reflects the distribution's relevant 
characteristics (Makowitz, 1952; Tobin, 1958; Sharpe, 1964; Linter, 
1965; Fama, 1976). 
As described in Chapter 3, the conceptual framework of models 
selected for this study can be traced to a model of behavior which is 
based on the rational choice of the decision maker. Therefore, the 
factors relevant to risk attitudes and risk perceptions would also be 
relevant to the probability models. In this study, the indicators of 
wealth and income were readily obtainable. However, the amount of 
risk involved in farming was assumed to be implicit in the farm 
operators' financial ratios. As it will be explained in the next section, 
financial ratios are often used to compare the status of specific farms 
to industry standards. 
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Due to the lack of theorectical work upon which one might 
hypothesize relationships between risk/risk attitude and other socio­
economic attributes, regression methods have been used to sort out 
meaningful farming and decision maker characteristics, which are 
measurable and are suspected to be related to risk and risk attitude. 
Halter and Mason (1978) entered eleven farm and decision maker 
characteristics into a regression model with risk attitude (ARAC) as 
the dependent variable. They found that the variables age, 
education, and the percentage of land ownership, either owned 
separately or jointly, were significantly related to risk attitude. 
Wilson and Bid m an (1981) also attempted to test whether the 
estimated risk measure was correlated with producers' socio­
economic attributes. Although their study did not produce 
conclusive results, some associations between risk attitudes and 
socio-economic variables were obtained. 
The following section will discuss some of the common 
variables that are employed in the model and are suspected to be 
related to risk and risk attitude. 
4.2 Dependent and exolanatorv variables 
In specifying the probability models in Chapter 3, the 
dependent variable was found to have a qualitative measure 
representing only two possible categories: presence or absence of an 
outcome. The independent variables, on the otherhand, are a 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative measures where 
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some of the qualitative variables represent only two alternatives, 
while others may represent more than two categories. 
4.2.1 The dependent variable ANYMPI represents a 
dichotomous random variable that indicates whether or not the Iowa 
farmers selected for the sample purchased any corn or soybean 
Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance in 1988 and/or 1989. The farmers 
who purchased crop insurance were assigned a response code of 1, 
while those who chose not to purchase crop insurance were given a 
response code of 0. As discussed earlier, ANYMPI represents a latent 
preference for either of the two alternatives, which are related to 
exogenous variables. The dependent variable can also be viewed as 
the probability of purchasing crop insurance, such that the 
probability. P., is a transformation of 
4.2.2 Independent exolanatorv variables The independent 
variables include characteristics of the farms and the decision 
makers (i.e., farmers) that one suspects might be related to risk and 
risk attitudes (Halter and Dean, 1971; Officer and Halter, 1968). 
Some of the explanatory variables are continuous while others are 
discrete. The discrete variables were used both to classify 
quantitative measures and to categorize qualitative characteristcs, as 
explained below: 
AGE: (Operator age) The age of the farm operator is 
hypothesized to be a factor explaining the 
operator's risk attitude towards purchasing a crop 
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insurance policy. Younger farmers are more likely 
to experience greater levels of financial risk. They 
they are also likely to have more education with 
regard to ways of transferring risks which includes 
the role of crop insurance, and are, therefore, more 
likely to purchase crop insurance to reduce their 
total risk. 
EDUCAT: (Operator education) The education variable is a 
dummy variable indicating the farm operator's 
highest level of education. Those who attended 
Grade School were assigned a code of 1. Those who 
attended High School were given a code of 2, while 
those with college or vocational education were 
assigned a code of 3. It is reasonable to expect that 
with a higher level of education a farmer might be 
better equipped to transfer some risk associated 
with crop farming by simply purchasing crop 
insurance. However, that expectation may not be 
realized if the education factor interacts with other 
factors that influence decision making. For 
example, Halter and Mason (1978) concluded that 
college graduates became more risk averse with 
increasing age,while grade school-educated 
farmers become more risk preferring. This 
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conclusion was reversed, however, when the age 
effects were held constant. They also observed that 
farmers who owned larger percentages of land 
tended to show a risk preference attitude with 
increasing educational levels. 
YRSFARM: (Years in farming) This variable represents the 
number of years the operators have engaged in 
farming. Due to strong correlations with AGE, 
YRSFARM is considered as an alternative variable. 
It is believed that the experience gained from years 
of farming, rather than the age of the operator, 
could better explain the crop insurance purchasing 
decision. 
GROS ALES: (1987 and 1988 gross sales) The total amount of 
farm related income generated by a farming 
enterprise is an indicator of the size of the 
operation. As such, it indicates something about the 
operator's dependency on farm income. Larger 
farming operations are likely to earn a higher 
percentage of their total income from farming, 
while smaller farming operations tend to rely more 
on off-far m income. As a result, to reduce the 
income volatility and to ensure their ability to meet 
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financial obligations, the larger farm operators are 
more likely to purchase crop insurance. 
CROPS: (1987 and 1988 crop percentages of gross farm 
sales) The total gross sales generated by a farming 
operation may not, by itself, provide information 
regarding the extent to which a farm is diversified. 
A substantial portion of Iowa farms are engaged in 
both the production of crops and the raising of 
livestock. The percentage of the farmer's total 
gross sales, which is attributed to the production of 
crops, is expected to have a positive correlation 
with the purchase of crop insurance. 
DAR: (Debt-to-asset ratio) As an indicator of a farm 
operator's financial risk exposure, DAR measures 
the proportion of owner equity the operator has in 
the farm; which reflects the extent to which the 
operator has borrowed against the farm's assets. If 
a farmer owes more than he/she owns, his/her 
debt-to-asset ratio exceeds 100 percent and the 
farmer is technically insolvent. This ratio is 
calculated as total outstanding debt divided by the 
farmer's estimate of the current market value of 
assets owned by the farming operation. In general. 
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farms with higher debt-to-asset ratios are more 
vulnerable if earnings or asset values decline. 
Therefore, farmers with high DAR are more likely 
to consider purchasing crop insurance, as an 
alternative to secure income, to meet their financial 
obligations. Creditors are more likely to insist upon 
it as well. 
ROAAT: (Return-on-assets after taxes) This variable is a 
ratio of after-tax cash flow to the value of assets. A 
higher amount of return on the same amount of 
assets is an indication of greater managerial skill, 
which allows a farmer to generate more income 
independent of the financing arrangement, Toland 
(1988) found that producers' management skills 
could be just as important as the soil type in 
determining insurable yield for the purchase of 
MPCI. 
FINSTRCL: (Financial stress category) Four code categories 
have been defined to broadly describe the financial 
position of the farm operators. Class 1 farms are in 
strong financial shape. Class 2 farms are in a stable 
position, but may sometimes experience financial 
stress. Class 3 farms are in a weak condition, and 
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may require major operating changes and/or debt 
and asset restructuring to stabilize the farm's 
financial position. Class 4 farms are severely 
stressed and their business survivial is unlikely if 
present financial conditions continue. A combina­
tion of solvency and liquidity measures for each 
farm was used to classify a farm operation into one 
of the four categories of financial position. Solvency 
is measured by the debt-to-asset ratio. Liquidity is 
measured by a ratio of cash flow to equity, where 
before-tax net cash flow is divided by the farm 
operator's net worth. One can hypothesize that 
those under financial stress will be more likely to 
use crop insurance in order to remain in business 
until they make major operating changes. On the 
other hand, it is perceivable that those in weaker 
financial conditions may stop purchasing crop 
insurance in order to reduce their total expenses. 
Because FINSTRCL is expected to be highly 
correlated with DAR and ROAAT, it will primarily 
be considered as a substitute for DAR and ROAAT. 
FWDCONTR: (Having used some type of forward contract in 
pricing grain or livestock during the previous two 
years) As a marketing tool that can mitigate 
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business risk, forward contracts, depending on the 
type of contract, can either make it possible to sell 
products at a future date and at a fixed price, at a 
price level that cannot be below some specified 
amount, or at a price that the farmer would specify 
at a later date. For this variable, those farmers who 
have engaged in forward contracting during the 
previous two years were assigned a value of 1, 
while those who did not engage in forward 
contracting were given a value of 0. Although 
forward contracts are useful in reducing the risk of 
price variability, the risk of crop failure remains 
unchanged. For example, if a greater amount 
of crops is forward contracted than is actually 
produced due to a short crop, the farmer must then 
purchase enough commodity from the market, at 
the prevailing price, to meet the terms of the 
contract. For this reason, it is expected that those 
who engage in forward contracting would purchase 
crop insurance. Forward contracting may also be 
viewed simply as a measure of risk aversion. 
DECOUPLE: (Decoupling current income support programs) This 
variable indicates the farmers' belief in moving 
towards a market oriented policy by decoupling 
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and phasing down income supports over several 
years. If a farmer favors such a policy, he/she 
was given a value of 1 ; while those who were not 
sure were assigned a value of 2, and those who 
oppose were given a value of 3. Analogous to 
utility function analysis where tastes and beliefs 
are partly responsible for explaining a certain 
behavior, this variable is intended to play a similar 
explanatory role in the mutiple regression model. 
It is reasonable to expect that those who support 
dismantling government support programs would 
be more likely to practice self reliance and risk 
management, which would include the purchase of 
crop insurance. 
TENURCL: (Tenure class) The variable TENURCL is given a 
value of 1, 2 or 3 depending upon whether or not 
the crop land is rented, both partially rented and 
owned, or entirely owned, respectively. It has 
been argued that farmers who rent crop land may 
be more obligated to secure some return from their 
farming operation by signing up for crop insurance. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that renting 
crop land may very well constitute another method 
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of self insurance and diversification, therefore 
reducing the need for MPCI. 
DRGTCRDP: (Drought Assistance Act crop disaster payments) 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides 
many types of assistance to farmers and other rural 
residents, as the result of natural disasters such as 
drought, fire, flood, etc... The relief programs for 
the drought of 1988 fell into two categories: 
implementation of existing legislation and the 
passage of the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988. 
DRGTCRDP is a dichotomous variable that 
distinguishes those crop farmers who received, or 
expected to receive, assistance at the time of the 
survey from those who did not receive any 
assistance through the passage of the Disaster 
Assistance Act of 1988. If a farmer received or 
expected to receive disaster assistance, he/she was 
given a value of one, while those who did not or 
were not expecting to receive such payments were 
assigned a value of zero. As noted earlier, one 
reason for poor participation rates in the federal 
crop insurance program, as many suggest, is that 
the availability of disaster assistance supports 
45  
the producers' belief that a widespread natural 
disaster will be accompanied by government 
assistance and thus reduces producers' incentive to 
purchase crop insurance. 
CO: (Iowa counties) Historically, participation in crop 
insurance programs has been highest where 
farmers perceive the risk to be the greatest. Many 
farmers believe that southern Iowa counties have a 
higher risk of being hit by drought than do other 
regions in the state. They argue that southern 
counties have experienced more drought in recent 
years than have other parts of the state. Figure 1. 
is a map of the State of Iowa, which illustrates the 
99 county boundaries within the state. As shown in 
Figure 1., the southern three tiers of Iowa counties 
were given a value of CO = 1, while the remaining 
counties were assigned the value of CO = 0. 
GOV ACT: (Likelihood of future disaster assistance) The 
farmers in the sample were asked to rate the 
likelihood of the government passing another 
assistance package similar to the 1988 Drought 
Assistance Act in the event that another drought of 
similar severity were to occur in the upcoming 
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Bsaanr 
Southern counties with CO-1 
Figure 1. Map of Iowa 
year. Five levels of likelihood were established to 
cover all possible responses. The levels included: 
very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, not sure, 
somewhat likely and very likely. The sample 
responses were coded with values of 0 through 4, 
with 0 representing the responses of very unlikely. 
It has been argued by many that farmers often 
decide against crop insurance enrollment based 
upon their belief that the government will grant 
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disaster assistance in the event of a widespread 
disaster. If this argument is true, then one would 
expect to find that the likelihood of purchasing 
MPCI would decrease as the value of GOV ACT 
increases. 
OFF ARM: (Off-farm income) An additional source of income 
could negate the need for purchasing crop 
insurance. On the other hand, the off-farm income 
may make the purchase of MPCI affordable to some 
farmers who would not have otherwise been able to 
purchase insurance. It is perceivable that off-farm 
income may affect the purchasing decision in one 
way or another. 
ACRTOT: (Total acres of land operated) Whether the farmers 
own or rent the land they operate, it is reasonable 
to argue that the farmers will be more likely to 
purchase crop insurance as more acres of land are 
put into production. However, this argument could 
be dismissed on the grounds that both small and 
large farmers may consider insurance coverage a 
necessary measure to protect their financial 
investments against crop failure. 
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NW: (Net worth) Farming operations of various size 
may have the same debt-to-asset ratios, but may 
face different amounts of risk depending upon the 
size of their operation. For this reason, the 
explanatory variable NW is used to reflect the total 
difference between the debts and assets of a 
farming operation. Although Arrow (1963) and 
Pratt's (1964) assertion of the risk attitude being a 
decreasing function of wealth was challenged by 
some reasearchers (King and Robison, 1981; Patrick, 
Blake and Whitaker, 1981), it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that producers with large net worth 
have an increased financial ability to self insure. 
This implies that wealthy producers are more likely 
to consider self insurance as an alternative to 
purchasing MPCI. 
YEAR: To distinguish the MPCI purchasing decision for 
1988 from those for the 1989 crop year, the 
dummy variable YEAR was used in the model. Data 
pertaining to the 1988 crop year was identified by 
assigning the variable YEAR a value of 0, whereas 
YEAR = 1 signified the 1989 data. 
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4.1 Source of data 
Data for estimating the models was taken from the 1989 Iowa 
Farm Finance Survey of farm operators conducted in March, 1989 
(Edelman and Khojasteh, 1989). The survey questionnaires were 
mailed to a representative sample of 2,524 Iowa farm operators, and 
1,316 responses were received. This survey included variables on 
demographic status, farm production characteristics, financial status, 
farm policy preferences and marketing practices (see Appendix). 
Disaster assistance and crop insurance questions were a major 
focus of the 1989 survey. Specifically, Iowa farm operators were 
asked about (a) 1988 and 1989 multiple-peril crop insurance 
purchase decisions, (b) 1988 multiple-peril crop insurance indemnity 
payments, (c) 1988 disaster assistance payments, and (d) attitudes 
towards various public policy alternatives regarding multiple-peril 
crop insurance and disaster assistance. Out of the 1,316 survey 
responses, this analysis focused on 752 Iowa farm operators who 
indicated that they had planted crops and sold over $1,000 of 
agricultural products during 1988. The operators' age and farm-size 
distribution of the overall sample were similar to those in previous 
surveys and the Census of Agriculture (See Table 4.3), and were 
judged to be respresentative of commercial farm operators by the 
survey indicators. 
Farmers receiving 1988 disaster payments for losses greater 
than 65 percent were required by the 1988 Disaster Assistance Act 
to purchase 1989 multiple-peril crop insurance. In this study, the 
Table 4.3 Comparison of farm size indicators from census 
and 1985-1989 farm finance survey samples. 
Farm Size Farm Finance Survevs AG. Census 
(acres) 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1987 1982 
1-49 1.4 3.1 1.7 1.7 1.1 18.0 17.2 
50-179 15.3 13.2 15.8 16.5 15.2 26.2 26.8 
180-499 49.5 48.5 49.9 51.9 54.0 37.1 40.1 
500-999 26.6 27.2 27.1 24.4 25.0 15.1 12.9 
1,000 & up 7.1 7.9 5.5 5.4 4.7 3.5 2.7 
Avg. 454 463 445 424 433 301 283 
Source: Edelman and Khojasteh, 1989. 
farmers required to purchase MPCI in 1989 were distinquished from 
farmers for whom the crop insurance purchase decision was optional. 
After deleting the observations with missing data, and those 
involving farmers who were required to purchase MPCI in 1989, the 
regression data included 434 farmers. 
There were also some assumptions that needed to be made. 
First, it was assumed that the reported counties, total acres in 
operation, tenure class of the farmers, and the farmers' political 
views of the U.S. agriculture policy in 1989 did not change from what 
they were in 1988. Second, the 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Surverv 
asked the sample farmers to report their 1988 gross farm income 
from their 1988 tax records. The survey, however, did not inquire 
about the farmers' 1987 income which would have been the 
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appropriate factor for 1988 crop insurance purchase decisions. 
Therefore, the sample farmers were assumed to have had the same 
amount of farm-related income in 1987 as they did in 1988. A 
comparison of the results from the 1988 and 1989 surveys revealed 
that this assumption was permissable for purposes of this study as it 
showed that the average farm incomes for 1988 were very similar to 
those in 1987, despite the impact of the 1988 drought. In fact, the 
net farm income for 1988 was only $600 below the record high of 
1987 (see Appendix). However, it could be argued that while the 
income average remained approximately the same the distribution of 
income generated by the farmers could vary significantly between 
the two study years. However, because a majority of the 1988 farm 
income was attributed to various government payments, it was 
presumed that the variation of farmers' income between the two 
years was less volatile, perhaps, compared to other years. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The results of the three probability models are discussed 
below. While the linear model is a very powerful estimation tool 
given the ease with which inferences can be made from the data, it's 
findings could be easily misleading due to misspecification of the 
model. Probit and log it models, though both fundamentally resting 
on a linear relationship between dependent variables and the 
exogenous variables, provide two nonlinear specifications which are 
more plausible in cases with limited dependent variables (i.e., 
variables having values between 0 and 1) as explained in Chapter 3. 
"5,1 Variabl? gpççjfjçatiQns 
Since there has been little theoretical work upon which one 
could, with some confidence, base a relationship between the 
purchase of crop insurance and some explanatory indicators, all of 
the 18 independent variables described in the previous chapter were 
entered into the three probability models along with the 
dichotomous variable ANYMPI which served as the dependent 
variable. To determine the important explanatory variables, 
stepwise procedures were used to initially select variables that were 
significant at at least a 70 percent confidence level. 
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All 18 independent variables were also subjected to a 
backward elimination routine. In this procedure, all variables were 
initially entered into the model, including the intercept, and the least 
important variables were removed from the model one by one. 
Judged by their statistical influence in producing the largest F 
value, the results of the stepwise and backward elimination 
procedures for each model were compared to each other. As a result 
of this comparison, it was determined that the variables representing 
years in farming (YRSFARM), crop percentage in the total gross sales 
(CROPS), likelihood of future disaster assistance from the government 
(GOVACT), debt-to-asset ratio (DAR), off-farm income (OFFARM), 
tenure class (TENURCL), financial stress class (FINSTRCL) and 
education (EDUCAT) should be removed from the models. The 
variables representing southern and nothern counties (CO), age of the 
farm operator (AGE), payments of drought assistance (DRGTCRDP), 
total gross sales (GROSALES), opinion on the direction of government 
policy (DECOUPLE), total acres operated (ACRTOT), total new worth 
(NW), return-on-assets after taxes (ROAAT), forward contracting 
(FWDCONTR), and YEAR were retained in the models. 
A casual inspection of the correlation coefficients among the 
variables suggested that it would be necessary to perform another 
round of stepwise routines, which also included interaction terms 
among the variables. The results of this stepwise routine were found 
to be very unstable, the signs and significance of the coefficients 
changed with every slight modification in the entry/stay signficance 
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level in the stepwise procedure, and the results, at best, were 
difficult to interpret. In the final analysis, it was decided that only 
the interaction term between AGE and GROS ALES (GROSAGE) would 
be included in the model. The estimates of the variable coefficients 
retained in the model, as well as the estimates of the residuals, must 
then be assumed to reflect the net effect of all excluded variables 
and interaction terms. 
5,2 Linear Probability (LPM) 
The results of the stepwise analysis are shown in Table 5.2a. 
Contrary to what one might have expected, the preliminary 
inspection of the results indicates that the chances of a crop farmer 
purchasing multiple-peril crop insurance has more to do with 
characteristics that are not, at least directly, indicators of the 
financial well-being of the farming operation. For instance, debt-to-
asset ratio, which was an indicator of the financial risk exposure of 
the farming business was omitted from the model. FINSTRCL, which 
was intended to describe the financial position of the farm operators, 
was also removed from the model. However, the variables 
measuring gross sales and the rate of return-on-assets were 
marginally retained in the model. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, estimates of LPM, using ordinary 
least squares, are not efficient though unbiased. As a result, 
estimates of the sampling variances will not be correct, and any t or 
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Table 5.2a Results of stepwise regression using Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Prob.> F 
Regression 11 23.263 2.115 9.56 0.0001 
Error 740 163.694 0.221 
Total 751 186.957 R2 = 0.12 
Variable Parameter Standard Error t-value 
Estimate 
Intercept 0.55676 0.13307 4.184 
CO 0.12618 0.04664 2.705 
AGE -0.00659 0.00214 -3.083 
DRGTCRDP 0.19093 0.05021 3.803 
GROSALES -0.01494E-4 0.00054E-3 -2.766 
GROSAGE 0.316 llE-7 0.0000 lE-3 2.951 
DECOUPLE 0.08819 0.02291 3.849 
ACRTOT 0.00013 0.07722E-3 1.721 
NW -0.00235E-4 0.00007E-3 -3.543 
ROAAT 0.00201 0.00116 1.735 
FWDCONTR -0.03604 0.03714 -0.970 
YEAR 0.09657 0.04037 2.392 
F values based on these variances will not be accurate. In order to 
reduce the chance of committing a Type II error (i.e., erroneously 
excluding relevant factors), variables ACRTOT, ROAAT and 
FWDCONTR were retained in the model despite their lower t-values. 
Other variables were excluded because their t-values were too small 
and their inclusion would have sharply increased the risk of 
committing a Type I error. Furthermore, there is a good chance that 
the variables retained in the model would carry many of the 
explanatory characteristics present in the excluded variables. For 
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example, ROAAT and GROS ALES explain a good deal of the variation 
that would have come from DAR or FINSTRCL. 
Another difficulty with the LPM model is that there is no 
guarantee that the predicted probabilities would be confined to the 
unit interval (0,1). This problem was minimal in the present case 
because there were only three outliers (two below 0 and one above 
1 ). which could easily be attributed to sampling error. 
Correction for heteroscedasticity may be obtained using 
Goldberger's (1964) Weighted Least Squares (WLS) procedure. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the weights are the reciprocals of the 
estimated standard errors of the disturbances which are, in turn, 
derived from subtracting predicted values from the corresponding 
values of the dependent variables. In the above model, because 
three of the predicted values were out of the unit interval range, the 
weights could not be defined for three of the observations. However 
as a practical solution, the one predicted value that was greater than 
one was redefined to equal a value of 0.999, while those values (i.e., 
predicted probabilities) that were less than zero were redefined to 
equal a value of 0.001. The results of the weighted least squares 
regression are presented in Table 5.2b. As these results illustrate, 
the estimates of the coefficients are not only unbiased, but also have 
smaller variances. 
Comparing the OLS and WLS results, it appears that the 
coefficient estimates from WLS are noticeably different from those of 
OLS. In particular, GROS ALES , ACRTOT and GROSAGE lost their 
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significance, while other variables became more significant. 
Moreover, the coefficient for NW changed from a negative to a 
positive value. Although the high from the WLS regression may 
Table 5.2b Results of weighted least squares regression 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Prob. > F 
Regression 12 2994.005 249.500 219.72 0.0001 
Error 740 840.298 1.136 
Total 752 3834.302 R2 = 0.78 
Variable Parameter Standard Error t-value 
Estimate 
Intercept 0.59420 0.13740 4.325 
CO 0.10567 0.43596E-1 2.424 
AGE -0.00861 0.20741E-2 -4.151 
DRGTCRDP 0.13849 0.49780E-1 2.782 
GROSALES -0.00784E-4 0.00052E-3 -1.498 
GROSAGE 0.10827E-7 O.OOOOlE-3 1.088 
DECOUPLE 0.10067 0.22823E-1 4.411 
ACRTOT 0.40733E-4 0.74420E-4 0.547 
NW 0.00191E-4 0.00003E-3 6.995 
ROAAT 0.00259 0.42552E-3 6.082 
FWDCONTR -0.04302 0.36059E-1 -1.193 
YEAR 0.14075 0.41972E-1 3.353 
indicate a good fit, the markedly different coefficient estimates 
would suggest that the linear probability model may not be quite 
acceptable. Ordinarily, one would expect a higher sampling variance 
with OLS estimates compared with WLS, however there should be 
little change in the coefficient estimates. It should be noted that the 
high R2 value represents the portion of the sum of squares of 
deviation of the "weighted" values of dependent variables that can 
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be attributed to "weighted" independent variables. For this reason, 
any comparison between the OLS and the under WLS is 
misleading. 
iQgistiç probability modgl 
The linear probability model has been shown to provide 
reasonably accurate predictions in forecasting bankruptcy cases 
(Collings and Green, 1982). However, it has been criticized because 
there is no guarantee that the predicted probabilities fall within the 
unit interval (Judge et al., 1980), and as discussed above the 
inconsistent estimates would also invalidate any hypothesis testing 
(e.g., the t and F tests) or measures of fit such as R^-
Furthermore, while correction for heteroscedasticity was 
possible by subjecting the regression to a proper weight using the 
predicted probabilities, such weights were not applicable to all 
observations since some of the predicted probabilities fell out of the 
range of zero to one. Neither Johnston (1984) or Pyndick and 
Rubinfeld (1981) recommend the application of the weighted least 
squares method. While Pyndick and Rubinfeld prefer using the OLS 
method in this situation, Johnston recommends using neither method. 
As an alternative to the linear specifications of the probability 
model, a dichotomous logit model was assumed to be the correct 
specification of the relationship between the probability of 
purchasing MPCI crop insurance and other characteristics associated 
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with Iowa crop farming. The results of the logit regression 
procedure are shown below in Table 5.3. 
Analagous to F statistics in the linear model, the likelihood ratio 
statistic for overall fit can be used to test the joint hypothesis that all 
coefficients, except the intercept, are equal to zero in the logistic 
Table 5.3 Results of logit regression model 
Number of Observations 752 
Log Likelihood -469.51 
Chi-Square statistic for overal fit 99.29 with 11 d.f. 
Pseudo R2 = : 0.17 
Variable Parameter Standard t-value 
Estimate Error 
Intercept 0.27668 0.60157 0.460 
CO 0.58372 0.21434 2.723 
AGE -0.02996 0.98734E-2 -3.034 
DRGTCRDP 0.85142 0.22981 3.705 
GROSALES -0.68791E-5 0.25114E-5 -2.739 
GROSAGE 0.14553E-6 0.50192E-7 2.899 
DECOUPLE 0.40298 0.10507 3.835 
ACRTOT 0.61328E-3 0.36033E-3 1.702 
NW -0.11077E-5 0.32649E-6 -3.393 
ROAAT 0.91993E-2 0.54609E-2 1.685 
FWDCONTR -0.16393 0.16945 -0.967 
YEAR 0.43326 0.18232 2.376 
model. This statistic, which approximately follows a Chi-square 
distribution, is calculated to be 99.29 for the logit model. The 
probability of a null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero 
is, therefore, less than 0.005. Furthermore, because the mean and 
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variance of the dependent variable are not separable parameters in 
the models with qualitative dependent variables, one cannot report a 
R2 which shows the proportion of the variation in the dependent 
variable that is "explained" by the independent variables. However, 
a pseudo-R^ that to some degree indicates the success in fit is 
reported to be 17 percent for this model. 
Indicators of years in farming, education, financial stress class, 
off-farm income, debt-to-asset ratio, the percentage of crops in the 
overall farming operation, the likelihood of future disaster assistance 
from the government and tenure class were removed from the 
model. Except for the variables measuring forward contracting, total 
acres and rate-of-return on assets, the remaining variables seemed 
to be significant if the significance level was set between 0.01 and 
0.025. Variables reflecting the farmers' political views on 
agricultural policy (DECOUPLE) and Drought Assistance Act payments 
(DRGTCRDP) were the most significant explanatory variables, while 
YEAR and the rate-of-return on assests (ROAAT) were the least 
significant exogenous variables retained in the model. Finally, the 
signs on the coefficients of variables GROS ALES (gross sales), AGE, 
NW (net worth), and FWDCONTR (forward contracting) were negative, 
while the remaining variables had a positive effect on the purchase 
of crop insurance. 
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'^.4 Probit model 
When comparing the sample farmers' actual decisions to 
purchase crop insurance with the predicted values from the log it 
model, it is evident that out of the 404 farmers who had not 
purchased MPCI (i.e., ANYMPI = 0) the logit model correctly 
identified 309 of them, while it incorrectly predicted that the 
remaining 95 farmers had purchased MPCI when in fact they had 
not. On the other hand, out of the 348 farmers who actually 
purchased MPCI (i.e., ANYMPI = 1), the model correctly identified 
189 purchasers while it incorrectly predicted that the remaining 159 
farmers had not purchased crop insurance. 
A probit model, which utilizes a cumulative normal distribution 
function for the regression model, yields another alternative to the 
linear probability model that satisfies the 0-1 restriction without also 
constraining the predicted values. Furthermore, because a normal 
curve has a longer tail towards approaching zero, it might provide a 
better fit and reduce the possibility of incorrect predictions. 
However, it should be stressed that the logistic and normal curves 
are very similar, and in practice yield estimated choice probabilities 
which differ by less than 0.02, and can only be distinguished by 
using very large samples (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). 
Table 5.4 contains the results of the probit model, which used 
the same explanatory variables as were used in the logit model. The 
stepwise procedure had removed the variables representing years in 
farming, crop percentage of gross farm sales, education, likelihood of 
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future disaster assistance, debt-to-asset ratio, and tlie indicators of 
financial stress class and tenure class from the regression model. 
The likelihood ratio test statistic of 98.57 indicates an overall good fit 
Table 5.4 MLE results for probit model 
Number of Observations 752 
Log Likelihood -469.87 
Chi-Square statistic for overall fit 98.57 with 11 d.f. 
Pseudo R2 = 0.16 
Variable Parameter Standard t-value 
Estimate Error 
Intercept 0.17356 0.36842 0.471 
CO 0.35127 0.12966 2.709 
AGE -0.18468E-1 0.60210E-2 -3.067 
DRGTCRDP 0.51607 0.13891 3.691 
GROSALES -0.41327E-5 0.15410E-5 -2.682 
GROSAGE 0.87197E-7 0.30500E-7 2.859 
DECOUPLE 0.24549 0.63869E-1 3.844 
ACRTOT 0.03641E-2 0.21700E-3 1.678 
NW -0.06342E-5 0.18530E-6 3.423 
ROAAT 0.56295E-2 0.32710E-2 1.721 
FWDCONTR -0.10287 0.10337 -0.995 
YEAR 0.26566 0.11166 2.379 
that is significant beyond the .005 level. Again, with the exception of 
the coefficients for forward contracting, total acres, and the rate-of-
return on assets, all coefficients are significant at a .025 significance 
level. ROAAT is significant at the .10 level. The indicators of the 
farmers' political views on agricultural policy (DECOUPLE) and the 
receipt of drought assistance payments (DRGTCRDP) remained the 
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most significant of all coefficients in the model. GROSALES, Age, net 
worth (NW), and forward contracting (FWDCONTR) were the only 
coefficients found to have negative values. 
S.S Comparison of LPM. loeit and orobit estimated models 
Crop insurance data was used to examine the effect of crop 
farming characteristics on the likelihood of Iowa farmers purchasing 
multiple-peril crop insurance. First, using the estimation methods of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares (WLS), a 
linear probability model (LPM) was studied. Later, the method of 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was used to derive estimates 
of the unknown parameters for both logit and probit models. Table 
5.5a compares the LPM, logit and probit estimates. 
A Chi-square statistic, using a likelihood ratio test with 11 
degrees of freedom, failed to accept the null hypothesis that the 
parameter estimates for both logit and probit models are equal to 
zero. The same can be said about the linear model if the model's F 
value compared to the table F value. However, there are problems 
with the linear model, as previously explained. The linear model 
yielded three predicted values that were out of the 0-1 range. In 
addition, the sign of the coefficient to NW changed from a negative to 
a positive value when the weight was applied. Finally, the linear 
model yielded four coefficient estimates which were not significant. 
These problems raise questions about the appropriateness of the 
model as an adequate description of the crop insurance data. 
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Table 5.5a Comparison of LPM, logit and probit estimates. 
Estimate of Variable LPM Logit Probit 
Intercept 0.59420 0.27668 0.17356 
signf. level .0001 NS* NS 
CO 0.10567 0.58372 0.35127 
signf. level .0156 .0065 .0067 
AGE -0.00861 -0.02996 -0.18468E-1 
signf. level 0.0001 .0024 .0022 
DRGTCRDP 0.13849 0.85142 0.51607 
signf. level .0055 .0002 .0002 
GROSALES -0.00784E-4 -0.6879 lE-5 -0.41327E-5 
signf. level NS .0062 .0073 
GROSAGE 0.10827E-7 0.14553E-6 0.87197E-7 
signf. level NS 0.037 0.043 
DECOUPLE 0.10067 0.40298 0.24549 
signf. level 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
ACRTOT 0.40733E-4 0.61328E-3 0.03641E-2 
signf. level NS 0.0888 0.0936 
NW 0.00191E-4 -0.11077E-5 -0.06342E-5 
signf. level 0.0001 0.0007 0.0006 
ROAAT 0.00259 0.9199E-2 0.56295E-2 
signf. level .0001 0.0921 0.0852 
FWDCONTR -0.04302 -0.16393 -0.10287 
signf. level NS NS NS 
YEAR 0.14075 0.43326 0.26566 
signf. level .0008 .0175 .0174 
Goodness of Fit F or 219.72 99.29 98.57 
Degrees of freedom 11, oo 11 11 
Significant beyond .0001 .005 .005 
R2 0.78 0.17** 0.17** 
* N S  =• not significant •*Cragg-Uhler 
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However, overall the results of the three probability models, as 
illustrated by the signs of the coefficients, show that there is general 
consistency between the models. 
Recalling equation (4) from Chapter 3 (Y.* = Z b^ X.^ - w.), it 
was noted that in deriving the probability models from a behavioral 
theory, an observable dichotomous variable Y was devised to reflect 
the sign of the unobservable variable Y*. Because the value of Y* 
cannot be observed, it's scale cannot be determined. As a result, one 
could multiply equation (4) by any arbitrary positive constant 
without changing the sign of Y*, and without effecting Y. As such, 
probit and logit coefficient estimates cannot directly be compared to 
each other because of a scale difference between the two. However, 
as previously noted, the parameter estimates are usually very close 
to each other. Furthermore, by rescaling the models to a comparable 
scale the difference between the two estimates becomes smaller. 
Madalla (1983) suggests that probit coefficients are about .5512 (or 
3'^/n) times the size of its logit counterpart, while Amemyia (1981) 
puts this factor around .625.3 
2 In a probit model, the underlying distribution function is for a normal 
random variable that has a mean of zero and a variance of one; whereas, in 
the logit model, the distribution function yields a variance of n^/3. 
3 Rescaling is also needed when the coefficients are compared to LPM 
coefficients. For example, Amemiya's approximation of .625 works as follows: 
Coefficients of LPM ~ .25 coefficients of Logit. except for the intercept. 
Coefficients of LPM ~ A coefficients of Probit, except for the intercept. 
Intercept of LPM » .25 intercept of Logit + .5. 
Intercept of LPM ~ A intercept of Probit + .5. 
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Prediction-success for tJie three models are presented in Table 
5.5b. The results indicate similar prediction capabilities for the 
probit and logit models, and proved to give more accurate 
predictions than the LPM. For example, while the percentage of 
predicted purchases of crop insurance by LPM was 52.2 percent, or 
Table 5.5b Prediction success table of probability models 
Predicted Predicted Observed Observed 
Purchase No Purchase Count Share 
Linear Model 
Actual Purchase 182 166 348 46.3 
Actual No Purchase 117 287 404 53.7 
% Correctly Predicted 60.9 63.4 62.3 — 
% Predicted to Actual 52.2 71.0 62.3 
Logit Model 
Actual Purchase 189 159 348 46.3 
Actual No Purchase 95 309 404 53.7 
% Correctly Predicted 66.5 66.0 66.2 
% Predicted to Actual 54.3 76.5 66.2 
Probit Model 
Actual Purchase 186 162 348 46.3 
Actual No Purchase 95 309 404 53.7 
% Correctly Predicted 66.2 65.6 65.8 — 
% Predicted to Actual 53.4 76.5 65.8 
182 out of 348; the logit model's success rate was 54.3 percent, or 
189 out of 348; and the probit model's success rate was 5 34 percent, 
or 186 out of 348. The results of the LPM implies a larger Type I 
error as it predicted that 29.0 percent, or 117 out of 404, of the 
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sample farmers had purchased crop insurance when in fact they had 
not. This compares to 23.5 percent, or 95 out of 404, by either the 
logit or probit models. Hensher and Johnson (1981) suggested that 
using posterior probabilities on actual cases which were correctly 
predicted would be a more appropriate way to compare the 
prediction accuracy between models. 
Accordingly, the logit and probit models would again offer 
more accurate predictions by correctly predicting 66.5 percent (189 
out of 284) and 66.2 percent (186 out of 281), respectively, while the 
linear model would correctly predict 60.9 percent of the cases (182 
out of 299). Overall, the results in Table 5 5b confirm that the logit 
and probit models would provide greater prediction accuracy, as 
they correctly predicted 66.2 percent and 65.8 percent of the cases, 
respectively, versus 62.3 percent of cases that were correctly 
predicted by the linear model. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Significant association was established between the purchase of 
crop insurance and some of the socio-economic factors as previously 
explained. Although some of the findings were visably consistent 
with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, some of the variables 
need futher interpretation as their significance is not as readily 
apparent. 
6.1 Interpretation of estimated croo insurance orobabilitv models 
The estimation of the probability of purchasing multiple-peril 
crop insurance P(ANYMPI = 1) by the three models is summarized 
below: 
I. Linear: 
P(ANYMPI = 1) = 0.59420 + (0.10567 x CO) - (0.00861 x AGE) + 
(0.13849 X DRGTCRDP) - (0.00784E-4 x GROS ALES) + 
(0.10827E-7X GROS AGE) + (0.10067 x DECOUPLE) + 
(0.40733E-4 x ACRTOT) + (0.0019lE-4 x NW) + 
(0.00259 X ROAAT) - (0.04302 x FWDCONTR) + 
(0.14075 xYEAR). 
II. Logistic: 
P(ANYMPI = 1) = where, 
1 + e^' 
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Z = 0.27668 + (0.58372 x CO) - (0.02996 x AGE) + 
(0.85142 xDRGTCRDP) - (0.6879 lE-5 x GROS ALES) + 
(0.14553E-6 xGROSAGE)+ (0.40298 x DECOUPLE) + 
(0.61328E-3 X ACRTOT) - (0.11077E-5 x NW) + 
(0.91993E-2 xROAAT) - (0.16393 x FWDCONTR) + 
(0.43326 X YEAR). 
I I I .  Prob i t :  
P(ANYMPI = 1) 
rz 1 
Vzn 
g(-wi/2)çj^ where, 
where: 
CO 
Z= 0.17356 + (0.35127 X CO) - (0.18468E-1 x AGE) + 
(0.51607 xDRGTCRDP) - (0.41327E-5 x GROS ALES) + 
(0.87197E-7xGROSAGE)+ (0.24549 x DECOUPLE) + 
(0.03641E-2 X ACRTOT) - (0.06342E-5 x NW) + 
(0.56295E-2 xROAAT) - (0.10287 x FWDCONTR) + 
(0.26566 X YEAR). 
County, it is equal to 0 if the farmer is located 
in a northern county, and otherwise equal to 1, 
AGE 
DRGTCRDP 
Age of the farmer. 
Whether or not the farmer received 
government crop disaster assistance payments. 
It is equal to 1 if he/she received assistance, 
and otherwise equal to 0. 
GROSALES = Total amount of farm related income. 
GROSAGE = GROS ALES x AGE. 
DECOUPLE = Whether or not the farmer believes in 
dismantling the government income support 
system, and moving towards market-oriented 
policy. If the farmer agrees with decoupling, 
DECOUPLE was equal to 1; if not sure, it was 
equal to 2; and if the farmer disagrees with this 
concept, it was equal to 3. 
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ACRTOT = Total acres of land in the farming operation. 
NW = Net worth of the farming enterprise, as defined 
by total assets less total debt. 
ROAAT = Return-on-assets after taxes. 
FWDCONTR = Having used/not used some type of forward 
contracting. If used, FWDCONTR was equal to 1, 
otherwise it was equal to 0. 
YEAR = 0 to indicate drought year of 1988, and equal 
to 1 to indicate the 1989 crop year. 
The consistency of the signs of the coefficients among the three 
models, and more importantly the consistency of the signs with the 
hypothesized effect of each exogenous variable, makes each of the 
models, particularly the non-linear models, a valid choice when 
explaining purchasing behavior. A positive sign indicates that the 
probability of purchasing MPCI increases with the value of the 
corresponding variable. 
All three estimated models indicate that, under the same set of 
circumstances, a farmer located in a southern county would be more 
likely to purchase crop insurance than would his/her northern 
counterpart. Furthermore, a Chi-square test of independence confirms 
that before the 1988 drought region was a factor in deciding whether 
to buy crop insurance, as shown in Table 6.1. However, the severity of 
the 1988 drought dissolved many doubts that northern Iowa farmers 
had about the necessity of crop insurance for the upcoming crop year. 
Age also proved to be a significant factor in purchasing crop 
insurance. The negative sign on the AGE coefficients in all three 
models implies that the probability of purchasing MPCI is greater 
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Table 6.1 Chi-Square test of independence between the 
purchase of crop insurance and region for 
crop years 1988 and 1989. 
1988 1989 
South North Total South North Total 
No purchase 36 238 274 No purchase 26 172 198 
Purchase 43 117 160 Purchase 53 183 236 
Total 79 355 434 Total 79 355 434 
Chi-squared = 12.80, dX. - 1 Chi-squared - 6.29, d.f. = 1 
significant beyond .005 significant beyond .025 
among younger farmers, and conforms with the corresponding 
hypothesis, as presented in Chapter 4. One reason for the negative 
impact of age on the purchase of MPCI could be the role of education, 
even though the education variable was excluded at the earlier 
stages of the modeling process due to its insignificant explanatory 
power. Younger farmers are more likely to purchase crop insurance, 
in part, because they are more educated and more informed about 
methods of reducing risk, which include the purchase of crop 
insurance. One could also argue that older farmers would have 
probably already passed the test of business survival, and would 
have acquired enough equity to afford the loss if they chose not to 
buy crop insurance. 
The 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survev showed that while the age 
group of 55 to 64 year old farmers had a net worth of $393,000 as of 
January 1, 1989, the younger farmers of age 34 or less had a net 
worth of $157,000. In addition, it showed that farmers between the 
ages of 35 and 44 tended to have the highest level of debt. Finally, 
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the debt-to-cash flow ratios were higher for farmers in the younger 
age groups. 
The age factor certainly appeared to have a significant role in 
explaining the effect gross sales has in the decision to purchase crop 
insurance. Gross sales (GROSALES) in all three models was 
accompanied by a negative coefficient, which implied that farmers 
with higher gross sales would be less likely to purchase MPCI. This 
conclusion is not consistent with the hypothesis presented in Chapter 
4. However at ages above 47, the results of the logit and probit 
models indicated a positive relationship between the purchase of MPCI 
and gross sales, while the linear model displayed this positive effect 
for farmers with ages above 72. This positive relationship between 
the purchase of MPCI and gross sales is due to an interaction factor 
between age and gross sales (GROSAGE), which appeared to have a 
positive impact on the purchase of multiple-peril crop insurance. 
The coefficient to drought crop disaster payment (DRGTCRDP) in 
all models (including many preliminary specifications that were 
omitted from this report) had a significant positive value, which 
indicated that those who received disaster payments were more likely 
to purchase crop insurance in the following year than were those who 
received no disaster assistance. This is consistent with the findings of 
the 1989 Farm Finance Survev (page 21 ), which concluded that: 
the passage of the 1988 Disaster Assistance Act has apparently 
not adversely affected farmers' attitudes toward the purchase 
of multiple-peril crop insurance as had previously been 
suggested. In fact, 22.6 percent of the respondents will buy 
more crop insurance as a result of the drought. 
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The result of the estimated models also revealed that, ironically, 
those who believe that the future direction of farm policy should move 
towards a market-oriented policy which includes phasing out income 
supports (i.e., decoupling) are less likely to purchase the MPCI. In 
other words, those who prefer the status quo are more likely to enroll 
in federal crop insurance programs than those who prefer a change 
towards a market-oriented farm policy. The hypothesis in Chapter 4 
had predicted an opposite effect. 
The coefficient to total acres (ACRTOT) was also positive and 
significant, which indicates that as the number of acres in production 
increases so will the farmer's probability of purchasing MPCI. 
Initially, the percent of gross sales from crop farming (CROPS) was also 
included in the models in order to explain the significance of the crop 
farming operation. However total acres, by itself, was chosen to be a 
better explanatory variable in part because it also reflected the size of 
the operation and was shown to have better explanatory power. In 
addition, it made the model more parsimonious by using fewer 
variables. 
The coefficient to net worth (NW) was negative and significant in 
all preliminary and final model specifications. This negative sign is 
consistent with the role of wealth in the expected utility hypothesis 
theory of behavior under risk. The negative sign implies that as the 
farmer moves to a higher wealth level, his/her attitude towards risk-
taking softens and becomes less risk-avert. In layman's terms, those 
who can afford the loss can and will go on farming without the 
purchase of crop insurance. 
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The coefficient to return-on-assets after taxes (ROAAT) is 
significant, at least at the 0.05 significance level. This variable could 
be used to indicate the farmer's managerial skill level, and shows how 
much after-tax cash flow is generated per dollar of asset. According to 
the results of the three models, farmers with greater managerial skill 
would be more likely to purchase crop insurance than those with 
poorer managerial skills. This finding is also consistent with the 
hypothesis outlined in Chapter 4. 
There was a weak indication that farmers who practice forward 
contracting (FWDCONTR) would be less likely to purchase MPCI. This 
would perhaps have been consistent with the view that a decline in 
business risk would lead to an acceptance of greater financial risk. 
However, this effect was found very insignificant in all three models. 
Finally, the variable YEAR coefficient was both positive and 
significant. The 1988 crop year was an unusual year for farmers for 
several reasons. First, that year was plagued by a drought, which was 
perhaps the second worst drought of the 20th Century. Second, 
preparations were underway to design the Farm Bill of 1990, which 
would determine the course of events for the next five years. Third, 
this year was especially important because it was an election year. 
Each of these three events could arguably affect a farmer's decision to 
purchase crop insurance for the upcoming year. The dummy variable 
YEAR played the role of a "shock indicator", which distinguished the 
actions taken by farmers prior to the events of 1988 from those which 
occurred afterward. This positive and significant coefficient reflected 
the hypothesis that those who were shocked by the events of 1988 
would be more likely to purchase crop insurance in the following year. 
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6.2 Is disaster assistance an impediment to MPCI enrollment? 
One of the goals of this study was to test (statistically) the 
validity of the argument that farmers decide against enrolling in the 
crop insurance program because they believe that emergency 
assistance will be granted in the event of a widespread disaster. The 
results of this study failed to reach this conclusion, and in fact the 
opposite result appeared. 
There could be several explanations for this unexpected finding. 
First, the argument that government disaster payments discourage 
farmers from participating in crop insurance programs may have been 
blown out of proportion. It may very well be argued that a payment 
received during a disaster, such as the drought of 1988, served as a 
reminder for farmers to participate in the crop insurance program. 
Furthermore, disaster payments may be viewed as an extra incentive 
for those already insured to continue their participation. Under the 
provisions of the Drought Assistance Act of 1988, producers with crop 
insurance could receive both insurance and disaster payments up to 
100 percent of their normal return. 
Second, this study is based on observations from respondents for 
whom the purchase of crop insurance was not required. This included 
farmers whose losses were less than 65 percent. However, in this 
group there were no disaster payments for those who had not 
participated in the Basic Commodities program, or were producing 
nonprogram crops if their losses were less than 36 percent. Program 
participants with 0 to 35 percent yield loss were forgiven the 
repayment of any deficiency payments on lost production. For those 
with yield losses of between 36 to 75 percent (for this study 65 
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percent), the amount of disaster payments depended on the type of 
crop and whether or not the farmer had participated in the Basic 
Commodities program. For participants, the program crop price was 
calculated to be 65 percent of the target price; and for nonparticipants 
the program crop price was 65 percent of the county loan rate, which 
was lower than the target price. Finally, for soybean farmers and 
farmers planting other nonprogram crops, the price used for 
calculating disaster payments was 65 percent of the five-year average 
price, excluding the high and low years (Duffy, 1988). In short, 
although the disaster payments offered a substantial amount of help 
to drought stricken farmers, the amount of the payments were, at 
best, 65 percent of the farmers' normal return, which is still an 
undesirable return for their effort. 
Finally, one should also consider the fact that in order for 
Congress to legislate ad hoc assistance a widespread natural disaster 
would have to occur, such as the drought of 1988. It is doubtful to 
assume that farmers expect a widespread natural disaster to occur on 
a yearly basis and, therefore, it is highly unlikely that farmers could 
afford to rely solely on government disaster payments for protection. 
In view of the above arguments, it is suggested that disaster 
payments alone, in fact, increase the likelihood of participation in the 
federal crop insurance program. However, this does not mean that the 
receipt of disaster assistance could not have a negative effect on the 
farmers' attitude towards crop insurance. In fact, there is a great deal 
of evidence which supports the view that disaster assistance payments 
interact with farmers' perceptions regarding the necessity of 
purchasing crop insurance. 
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For example, Tables 6.2a and 6.2b underscore this assertion. As 
was previously discussed, those who favor dismantling current 
agricultural policy in order to move away from an income support 
system and towards a market oriented policy are less likely to 
purchase crop insurance than are those who support the current 
government policy. At least this was the case among 1988 and 1989 
MPCI program participants in general. However, when the farmers 
Tables 6.2a & 6.2b Chi-Square test of independence 
between purchases of crop insurance 
and farmers' view on changing the 
current agricultural policy (DECOUPLE). 
6.2a MPCI vs. DECOUPLE without considering disaster payments 
19 oo
 
00
 
1989 
AGREE NOT 
SURE 
DIS­
AGREE 
TOTAL 
88 
AGREE NOT 
SURE 
DIS­
AGREE 
TOTAL 
89 
NO PURCHASE 109 79 45 233 87 55 29 171 
PURCHASE 44 62 37 143 66 86 53 205 
TOTAL 153 HI 82 376 153 141 82 376 
Chi square = 9.44 with 2 d.f Chi square - 13.76 with 2 di 
Interaction: Yes Interaction: Yes 
6.2b MPCI vs. DECOUPLE by drought assistance payments 
MPCI \ 
DECOUPLE 
DRGTCRDP=( 3 DRGl XRDP=1 
AGREE NOT 
SURE 
DIS­
AGREE 
TOTAL AGREE NOT 
SURE 
DIS­
AGREE 
TOTAL 
NO PURCHASE 63 40 17 120 24 15 12 51 
PURCHASE 30 45 24 99 36 41 29 106 
TOTAL 93 85 41 219 60 ?6 41 157 
Chi square - 11.29 with 2 d.f Chi square - 2.57 with 2 di 
Interaction: Yes Interaction: No 
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were grouped according to whether or not they received disaster 
assistance payments, those who received such payments displayed no 
correlation between their political view on government policy changes 
and the purchase of crop insurance in 1989. 
Similarly, according to Tables 6.2c and 6.2d, the farmers' 
decisions to purchase crop insurance in 1988 and 1989 seemed to be 
independent of how likely they thought future government disaster 
payments would be. However, when grouped according to whether or 
not they received disaster assistance payments, those who received 
such assistance indicated that the purchase or non-purchase of 1989 
crop insurance was not independent of their opinion regarding the 
likelihood of future government assistance. Those who thought that 
future assistance was unlikely were more likely to purchase crop 
insurance than were those who thought that future assistance was 
likely. A similar reaction was not displayed among those who did not 
receive government disaster payments. 
Although the data confirmed the existence of this correlation, the 
question remains whether or not the negative impact of disaster 
assistance payments could convince farmers not to participate in the 
MPCI program. The answer to this question depends on a number of 
other factors, including, and in particular, whether or not the farmers 
have previously participated in the program. Through the further 
breakdown of the data (not presented here), it seems that the negative 
effect is more evident among farmers who had not previously 
purchased crop insurance and, thus, may not know the advantages of 
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having crop insurance. This finding has serious implications for the 
future of the federal crop insurance program, especially as it relates to 
Iowa farmers. 
Tables 6.2c & 6.2d Chi-Square test of independence 
between the 1988 & 1989 purchases of 
crop insurance and attitudes toward 
the likelihood of future disaster 
payments (GOVACT). 
6.2c 1988 & 1989 MPCI vs. GOV ACT without considering disaster 
payments. 
MPCI vs. 
GOVACT: 
1988 1989 
0 1 2 3 4 Total 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
NO PURCHASE 38 61 53 48 33 223 20 41 41 38 27 171 
PURCHASE 23 32 33 38 14 143 37 52 45 48 23 205 
TOTAL 61 93 86 86 50 376 61 93 86 86 50 376 
Chi square - 2.25 with 4 di Chi square - 2.69 with 4 dJT 
Interaction: No Interaction: No 
6.2d 1989 MPCI vs. GOV ACT by drought assistance payments. 
MPCI 89 vs. 
GOVACT 
DRGL XRDP=0 DRGTCRDP=1 
0 1 2 3 4 Total 0 I 2 3 4 Total 
NO PURCHASE 19 27 32 26 16 120 5 14 9 12 11 51 
PURCHASE 11 23 23 28 14 99 26 29 22 20 9 106 
TOTAL 30 50 55 54 30 219 31 43 31 32 20 157 
Chi square - No with 4 di 
Interaction: No 
GOV ACT - 0 Very unlikely 
GOV ACT = 1 somwhat unlikely 
GOV ACT - 2 Not sure 
GOV ACT - 3 Somewhat likely 
GOVACT - 4 Very likely 
Chi square - 8.94 with 4 d.f 
Interaction: Yes 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study was to develop and empirically 
estimate probability models that could explain Iowa farmers' 
behavior regarding the purchase of multiple-peril crop insurance. 
The models under study included both linear and nonlinear single-
equations. While components of decision theory under risk have 
been woven into the models, the focus was shifted away from the 
selection of a utility function and towards the selection of indicators 
of risk attitude and the amount of risk. 
Using socio-economic measures from a sample of Iowa farmers 
as the exogenous variables, the study examined the purchasing 
behavior of the sample farmers during a period of time when one of 
the largest government disaster assistance programs was underway. 
The intent of this study was to research, among other things, the 
effect of government disaster assistance payments on farmers' 
participation in the multiple-peril crop insurance program. 
While, as hypothesized, significant association was established 
between the purchase of MPCI and some socio-economic factors, not 
all indicators were found to be relevant. 
7.1 Conclusions and implications 
Using data from the 1988 and 1989 crop years, this study found 
that the county of operation, age of the farm operator, receipt of 
government disaster assistance payments, total acres under operation, 
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total gross sales and net worth of the farming operation, rate-of-
return on assets after taxes, and the farmer's political view about the 
course of change in government policy were significant factors in 
determining which farmers will decide to purchase crop insurance. 
This study has further explained the role of goverment disaster 
payments in the purchase of crop insurance, and concluded that the 
receipt of such payments, given at the time of a disaster, encouraged 
farmers to participate in the federal crop insurance program. 
However, it may also create false expectations of future government 
disaster payments, which may have a negative impact on the 
likelihood of farmers' participation in the federal crop insurance 
program. This negative impact is possibly more detrimental, in terms 
of future enrollment, for farmers who have not previously 
participated in MPCI. 
One could translate this hypothesis into another set of 
probability models, which would include a variable indicating the 
farmers' previous participation in MPCI. After modifying the models 
described in Chapter 5 to include the variable which indicated MPCI 
purchases in 1988 (i.e., ANYMPI88), several stepwise procedures were 
conducted. In the final analysis, the independent variables 
ANYMPI88, AGE, DRGTCRDP, GOV ACT, DECOUPLE, ROAAT, and 
FWDCONTR were found to be most significant, as presented in Table 
7.1a The variables AGE, GOV ACT and FWDCONTR carry negative signs, 
which implies their negative impact on the probability of purchasing 
crop insurance. 
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Table 7.1a Comparison of LPM, logit and probit estimates. 
Estimate of Variable LPM Logit Probit 
Intercept 
signf. level 
.313941 
.0001 
0.33133 
•NS' 
0.18035 
.NS 
AGE 
signf. level 
-0.15090E-2 
.0464 
-0.36461E-1 
.0231 
-0.21297E-1 
.0226 
DRGTCRDP 
signf. level 
0.060149 
.0235 
1.50644 
.0001 
0.83171 
.0001 
GOV ACT 
signf. level 
-0.22330E-2 
.NS 
-0.25333 
.0496 
-0.14435 
.0530 
DECOUPLE 
signf. level 
0.66830E-2 
.4873 
0.43388 
.0434 
0.26705 
.0339 
ANYMPI88 
signf. level 
0.69989 
.0001 
4.93285 
.0001 
2.69826 
.0001 
ROAAT 
signf. level 
0.19690E-2 
.0086 
0.17202E-1 
NS 
0.99533E-2 
NS 
FWDCONTR 
signf. level 
-0.64537E-1 
.0001 
-0.753228 
.0341 
-0.44915 
NS 
Goodness of Fit 
F or Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Significant beyond 
Psuedo 
2336.09 
7, o o  
.0001 
0.98 
248.57 
7 
.005 
0.65 
247.21 
7 
.005 
0.64 
*NS = not significant 
In these models, the linear probability model (LPM) had an 
overall prediction success rate of 81 percent, whereas the logit and 
probit models both had success rates of over 84 percent. Although all 
three models presented valid choices for probability determination, 
the results of the logit model were used to illustrate some of the 
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possible implications that drought disaster payments and the 
likelihood of future assistance had on farmers' crop insurance 
purchase decisions. 
For example, the average age of farmers, according to the 1989 
Iowa Farm Finance Survev. was 55 years of age. Also according to the 
survey results, the average after-tax rate of return on assets was 8.9 
percent. Table 7.1b presents several scenarios using the estimated 
coefficients. In column one of this table, is a case of an average Iowa 
farmer who previously purchased crop insurance, received drought 
disaster payments, is not sure about the likelihood of future disaster 
Table 7.1b Probability table of crop insurance purchase 
decisions under various scenarios. 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Previous 
Purchase Yes No No No No No 
AGE 55 55 30 30 30 30 
DRGTCRD Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
GOVACT 3 3 0 4 4 0 
DECOUPLE 2 2 3 3 3 3 
ROAAT 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 
FWDCONTR Yes Yes No No No No 
PROBABILITY 94% 10% 66% 42% 77% 90% 
FUTURE MPCI 
PURCHASE Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
GOVACT - 0 
GOVACT = 1 
GOVACT - 2 
GOVACT - 3 
GOVACT = 4 
Very unlikely 
somwhat unlikely 
Not sure 
Somewhat likely 
Very likely 
Decouple - 1 Supports decoupling 
Decouple - 2 Not sure 
Decouple - 3 Does not support decoupling 
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assistance payments (GOVACT = 3), is not sure about the need for 
future changes in the agricultural policy (DECOUPLE = 2), and was 
engaged in forward contracting. In this scenario, the likelihood of the 
farmer's future participation in MPCI is estimated to be 94 percent. If 
the same farmer had not previously participated in the crop insurance 
program, as shown in column two, his/her likelihood of future 
participation in the program would be 10 percent. Columns three 
through six of Table 7.1b provide other examples where it is 
perceivable that farmers would be expected to participate in the MPCI 
program even though they have not purchased crop insurance in the 
past. 
The findings of this study may provide an empirical basis for 
several policy recommendations to improve participation rates of 
farmers in the multiple-peril crop insurance program. For example, 
one way to increase the participation is to target promotion and/or 
subsidies to farmers who have not previously participated in the 
program, especially the younger farmers who are more likely to make 
purchases based on model indicators. One may also consider 
redirecting the government subsidy to reduce premiums for the 
younger farmers who are more likely to experience greater levels of 
financial risk. In pursuing this policy, perhaps the current 
government goal of rate setting on an actuarially sound basis should 
be temporarily abandoned in favor of enhancing the support net for 
young farmers entering the farming business. 
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7.2 Suggestions for future research 
LOW participation rates as well as the high costs of the federal 
crop insurance program and disaster assistance programs are major 
issues concerning the future status of federal crop insurance. This 
study examined some socio-economic factors that are believed to 
effect farmers' decisions to purchase multiple-peril crop insurance. In 
addition, this study investigated the relationship between crop 
insurance and disaster assistance payments. 
However, it is believed that the producers' dissatisfaction with 
the insurance program is another major factor which could effect the 
program participation rates. Producers often complain that premiums 
are excessive when compared to the amount of coverage they receive. 
In the future, this study could be expanded by including factors that 
are more directly related to the purchases of crop insurance, which 
could include producers recent or historical yield, yield coverage level, 
and the indemnity crop price. 
Although this study only considered farmers for whom the 
purchase of crop insurance was optional (not required), many more 
farmers are required by either banks and other financial institutions 
or by the federal government to obtain crop insurance for a variety of 
reasons. Additional research is needed to examine the effect that 
these requirements have on the farmers' decisions regarding crop 
insurance, and on the overall MPCI participation rate. 
Finally, the effect of other government programs on the MPCI 
purchase decision was not considered in this study. It could be argued 
that government income-support policies reduce the overall risks 
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(business and financial) faced by farmers and may lead to the 
assumption of additional business risk, including self insurance. 
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1989 IOWA FARM FINANCE SURVEY 
This survey was conducted by the Iowa State University Cooperative 
Extension Service and Agricultural Experiment Station with assistance of 
the Iowa Office of Agricultural Statistics. Iowa farm operators were 
asked for income tax return and balance sheet data to determine 
financial conditions as of January 1, 1989. This is the sixth survey 
since 1984. The purpose is to provide accurate research-based 
information on the financial performance of agriculture to farmers, 
policymakers and others with an interest in Iowa agriculture. 
I. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
The 1989 surveys were mailed to a representatives sample of 2,524 
Iowa farm operators. Responses from 1316 were returned. The financial 
analysis is based on 752 returns containing complete financial data. The 
revised sampling methods yielded a higher response than previous years. 
The strength of a mail survey depends upon how well the respondents 
represent characteristics of the total farm operator population. 
Similar to the previous surveys, 1989 respondents are undei—represented 
by younger farmers and smaller farms. So, the results are more 
representative of established commercial farms. 
TABLE 1. Comparison of Farm Size Indicators from Census 
and 1985-89 Farm Finance Survey Samples. 
Farm Size Farm Finance Surveys Ag. Census 
(acres) 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1987 1982 
1-49 1.4 3.1 1.7 1.7 1.1 18.0 17.6 
50-179 15.3 13.2 15.8 16.5 15.2 26.2 26.8 
180-499 49.5 48.5 49.9 51.9 54.0 37.1 40.1 
500-999 26.6 27.2 27.1 24.4 25.0 15.1 12. 9  
1,000 up 7.1 7.9 5.5 5.4 4.7 3.5 2.7 
H v u .  454 463 445 424 433 301 283 
buurco: IL'wa Farm Finance Survey, 1989; 1988; 1987; 1986; 1985; 
and ic'wa Census of Agriculture, 1982; 1987. 
I he 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey was prepared by Dr. Mark H. Edeliiiaii 
and Khosrow Kho.jasteh, Associate Professor and Graduate Assistant; 
Uepai trnenU of Economics, Iowa State University, PA WB4, June 6, 1989. 
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY 
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TABLE S. Comparison of Age Indicators from Census and 1985-89 
Farm Finance Survey Samples. 
Age Farm Finance Survey Ag. Census 
Group 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1987 1982 
< 35 4.0 6.0 
percent 
5.4 7.3 5.8 N.A. 22.5 
35-44 14.8 15.6 14.5 17.4 16.3 N.A. 19.5 
45-54 23.9 26.4 25.1 23.9 26.6 N.A. 22.6 
55-64 38.3 33.8 38.1 37.5 37.7 N.A. 23.9 
65 up 19.1 18.2 16.8 13.8 13.7 N.A. 11.5 
Avg. 55 54 54 53 54 N.A. 48 
N.A.= Not Available at Publication. 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1989; 1988; 1987; 1986; 1985; 
and Iowa Census of Agriculture, 1982; 1987. 
II. 1989 AVERAGE FINANCIAL INDICATORS COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS 
The January 1, 1989 balance sheet indicators list total assets at 
$453,000 and total debt at $113,000 per farm. These results show that 
the overall reduction in farm debt has slowed and many respondents are 
modestly increasing debt. In addition, total assets increased again this 
year, partially reflecting the recent rise in land values. As a result, 
average net worth per farm grew by $30,000 to $340,000 per farm in 1988. 
Net farm income for 1988 remained strong and near the 1987 record 
levels despite the impacts of the most severe drought since the 1930s. 
Net farm income for 1988 averaged $30,000—only $600 lower than the 
record high $30,600 for 1987. 
However, net farm incomes for 1988 and 1987 are significant!y 
higher than the previous years during the farm finance crisis. Net farm 
income before taxes averaged $17,300 in 1986, $1,000 in 1985 and $8,300 
in 1984. These numbers describe the variability in farm income and the 
dramatic climb out of the farm crisis for many—but not all—farmers. 
Financial ratios are often used to compare the status of specific 
farms to industry standards. Most of the ratios used in this report 
reflect a good year for 1988, but not as strong as 1987. 
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TABLE 3. Comparison of Financial Characteristics For Samples of Iowa 
Farm Operators on January 1, 1989, 1988, 1987, 1986 and 1985. 
FINANCIAL 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 
CHARACIEFdSTICS SURVEY SURVEY SURVEY SURVEY SURVEY 
QPERATORS (•/.) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Average Age 55 54 54 53 54 
Average Acres 454 463 445 424 433 
BALANCE SHEET ($000) 
Total Assets 453 420 366 382 501 
Non-Real Estate 173 174 145 142 165 
Real Estate 280 246 221 240 336 
Val/Acre 1087 974 892 1026 N.A. 
Total Debts 113 110 114 123 159 
Non-Real Estate 41 39 38 45 59 
Real Estate 72 71 76 78 100 
Net Worth 340 310 252 259 342 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT ($000) 
Gross Farm Income 140.2 136.6 127.2 115.5 112.0 
- Operating Expense 87.8 86.1 80.1 76.1 70.2 
- Interest Expense 10.5 11.2 13.1 15.3 17.6 
Net Cash Farm Income 41.9 39.3 34.0 24.1 24.2 
+ Inventory Change 2.4 7.3 0.4 (4.1) 3.4 
Ad.i Net Cash Farm Income 44.5 46.6 34.4 20.0 27.6 
- Depreciation 14.5 16.0 17.1 19.0 19.3 
NET FARM INCOME (bef tax) 30.0 30.6 17.3 1.0 8.3 
+ Off-Farm Income 11.3 11.1 10.6 8.1 6.5 
Income Before Taxes 41.3 41.7 27.9 9.1 14.8 
- Estimated Tax 10.9 10.4 8.0 4.3 4.0 
NET INCOME (aft tax) 30.4 31.3 19.9 4.8 iv.8 
- Est. Family Living 16.0 16.2 16.3 16.5 16.3 
Earned Net Worth 14.4 15.1 3.6 (11.7) (5.5) 
+ Depreciation 14.5 16.0 17.1 19.0 19.3 
- Inventory Change 2.4 7.3 0.4 (4.1) 3.4 
NET CASH FLOW (aft tax) 26.5 23.8 20.3 11.4 10.4 
FINANCIAL RISK INDICATORS (•/.) 
Debt/Asset Ratio 24.9 26.2 31.1 32.2 31 .7 
Non-Real Est Assets/Debt 422 446 382 316 280 
Interest/Gross Income 7.5 8.2 10.3 13.2 15.7 
Return on Assets (bef int) 8.9 9.9 8.3 4.3 5.2 
Return on Equity (aft int) 8.8 9.9 6.9 0.4 2.4 
Earned Net Worth Ratio 4.2 4.9 1.4 (4.5) (1.6) 
Debt/Net Cash Flow Ratio (yrs) 4 5 6 11 15 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey Data, 1989; 1988; 1987; 1986; and 1985. 
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TABLE 4. Farm Financial Analysis Ratios And Risk Indicators. 
WHAT IS YOUR DEBT LEVEL? 
Debt to Asset Ratio : 
Total Liabilities 
/ Total Assets 
Superior 
Good 
Close Watch 
Weak 
Inferior 
under 10% 
10% - 40% 
40% - 55% 
55% - 70% 
over 70% 
E. CAN YGU CUVER CURRENT OBLIGATIONS? 
Non-Real Estate Asset to Debt Ratioi 
Non-Real Estate Assets 
/ Non-Real Estate Liabilities 
Superior 
Good 
Close Watch 
Weak 
Inferior 
over 500% 
400% - 500% 
300% - 400% 
200% - 300% 
under 200% 
Note: Non-Real Estate Asset to Debt Ratio Standards are approximately 
two to three times commonly used standards for Current Ratios. 
3. WHAT IS YOUR INTEREST EXPOSURE? 
'Interest to Gross Income Ratio : 
Interest Expense 
/ Gross Income 
Superior 
Good 
Close Watch 
Weak 
Inferior 
under 10% 
10% - 15% 
15% - 20% 
20% - 25% 
over 25% 
4. WHAT'S THE PROFITABILITY OF THE WHOLE FARM? 
Return on Assets Ratio (bef int): 
Net Farm Income (bef tax) 
+ Interest Expense 
/ Total Assets 
Superior 
Good 
Close Watch 
Weak 
Inferior 
over 12% 
8% - 12% 
4% - 8% 
<.)% - 4% 
under 0% 
5. WHAT'S THE PROFITABILITY OF YOUR EQUITY INVESTMENT? 
Return on Equity Ratio (aft int): 
Net Farm Income (bef tax) 
/ Net Worth 
Superior 
Good 
Close Watch 
Weak 
Inferior 
over 10% 
6% - 10% 
2% - 6% 
(2%) - 2% 
under (2%) 
6. IS YOUR FIRM GROWING OR DECLINING? 
Earned Net Worth Ratio : 
Earned Growth in Net Worth 
/ Net Worth 
Superior 
Good 
Close Watch 
Weak 
Inferior 
over 8% 
4% - 8% 
0% - 4% 
(47.) - 0% 
under (4%) 
HOW MANY YEARS OF CASH FLOW WOULD IT TAKE IQ PAY OFF YOUR DEBT? 
Debt to Net Cash Flow (aft tax): Superior under 5 
Good 5-15 
Total Debt Close Watch 15 — 30 
/ Net Cash Flow (aft tax) Weak 30 over 
Inferior Neqative 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Surveys, 1985-89 and professional judgment. 
9 8  
III. FINANCIAL POSITION DEFINED BY DEBT LEVEL AND CASH FLOW 
In this report, four categories are defined to broadly describe the 
financial position of farm operators. Class 1 farms are in strong 
financial shape. Class 2 farms are in stable position but may sometimes 
experience stress. Class 3 farms are in weak condition and may require 
major operating changes and/or debt and asset restructuring to stabilize 
the farm's financial position. Class 4 farms are severely stressed and 
survival of the business is unlikely if present conditions continue. 
The classification scoring system in this report uses a combination 
of solvency and liquidity measures for each farm. Solvency is measured 
by the debt to asset ratio on January 1, 1989. For example, a debt to 
asset ratio of 40 percent means the farmer owes $40 in debt for each 
$100 of assets owned. If a farmer owes more than is owned, the debt to 
asset ratio exceeds 100 percent and the farmer is technically insolvent. 
In general, farms with higher debt to asset ratios are more vulnerable 
if earnings or asset values decline. 
Liquidity is measured by a cash flow to equity ratio. For this 
ratio, before-tax net cash flow is divided by the farm operator's net 
worth. In this study, before-tax net cash flow equals total cash sales 
for 1988 reported on 1RS Form 1040F, plus sales of breeding stock and 
off-farm income, less cash production expenses, interest, and estimated 
family living expenses. Net worth is defined as the difference between 
the farm operator's assets and its debts as of January 1, 1989. 
If before-tax net cash flow is positive, funds may be used to pay 
taxes, replace equipment, retire debt or expand the operation. If the 
cash flow is negative, the farm will require additional borrowing or 
liquidation of assets to offset the cash flow shortfall. For example, a 
ratio of minus SO percent indicates the farm lost a cash equivalent to 
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20 percent of its current net worth. If this loss level continues, the 
farmer would become insolvent within a few years. In contrast, a 
positive 20 percent ratio means strong earnings-to-investment capacity. 
The combinations of liquidity and solvency measures used to define 
the financial positions in this report are listed below. Severe stress 
is experienced by farms in the upper left and financial position 
improves as we move toward the lower right. The parentheses show the 
percent of all respondents with each combination. 
TABLE 5. Financial Positions Defined by Debt Level and Cash Flow. 
DEBT/ASSET CASH FLOW/EQUITY RATIO 
RATIO Less than -20 to -5 to 5 to Greater 
Insolvent -20% -5% 5% 20% than 20% 
Insolvent 1 4 1 
1 (3) 1 
-
1 1 1 1 
70-100% 
1 1 
4 
( + ) 
1 4 
1 ( + ) 
1 3 
1 (0) 
1 3 
( (1 ) 
3 1 
(3) 1 
40-70% 
1 1 
4 
(1) 
1 4 
1 (1) 
1 3 
1 (3) 
1 2 
1 (8) 
2 1 
(4) 1 
10-40% 
1 1 
3 
< 1) 
1 3 
1 (1) 
1 2 
1 <10) 
1 1 
1 (17) 
1 1 
(2) 1 
0
 
1 o
 
5Î 
1 1 
3 
(1) 
1 3 
1 (4) 
1 2 
1 (20) 
1 1 
1 (18) 
1 1 
(2) 1 
Top number is the financial class assigned to each respondent. 
Bottom number in ( ) is the percent of total respondents. 
(+) Indicates greater than zero but less than 0.5 percent. 
Source: 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
IV. CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION OF FARM OPERATORS BY FINANCIAL POSITION 
The results of the 1989 Farm Finance Survey reveals that a majority 
of farms remain in stable or strong financial status in spite of the 
1988 drought. Forty—two percent of the respondents are now in stable 
condition compared to 31 percent in the 1988 survey. However, only 39 
percent are considered financially strong compared to 48 percent last 
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year. This means that a greater proportion are now classified as stable 
rather than strong. Disaster Assistance, higher grain prices and farm 
program payments are among the apparent reasons for income stability. 
Also, rising land values contributed to improved balance sheet solvency. 
However in spite of three years of improved agricultural income 
conditions since the depths of the farm finance crisis, 19 percent of 
Iowa farm operators remain under weak or severe financial stress. While 
this is lower than the 31 percent in severe stress in the 1986 survey, 
it signifies that some restructuring will likely continue in the future. 
TABLE 6. Changes In Distribution of Iowa Farmers and Characteristics by 
Financial Position 1989, 1988, 1987, 1986, and 1985. 
FINANCIAL FINANCIAL POSITION 
CHARACTERISTICS STRONG STABLE WEAK SEVERE TOTAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATORS (•/.) 
January 1, 1989 39 42 14 5 100 
January 1, 1988 48 31 15 6 100 
January 1, 1987 45 29 15 11 100 
January 1, 1986 32 37 18 13 100 
January 1, 1985 28 42 18 12 100 
ASSET DISTRIBUTION ('/.) 
January 1, 1989 43 44 10 3 100 
January 1, 1988 50 34 12 A 100 
January 1, 1987 47 32 13 8 100 
January 1, 1986 33 40 16 11 100 
January i, 1985 27 45 18 10 100 
DEBT DISTRIBUTION (%) 
January 1, 1989 24 43 21 12 100 
January 1, 1988 25 35 25 15 100 
January 1, 1987 20 31 25 24 100 
January 1, 1986 14 30 27 29 100 
January 1, 1985 12 35 29 24 • 100 
FARM GROSS SALES DIST (•/.) 
January 1, 1989 46 37 11 6 100 
January 1, 1988 53 30 12 5 100 
January 1, 1987 47 31 13 9 100 
January 1, 1986 34 36 17 13 100 
January 1, 1985 31 39 19 11 100 
Sources: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1989; 1988; 1987; 1986; and 1985. 
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The 1909 Farm Finance Survey shows that a higher proportion of farm 
assets are now held by those with stable financial status rather than 
strong financial position. This reflects an erosion of financial status 
for many farmers as a result of the drought. 
Compared to last year, a higher proportion of the farm debt is now 
held by those in stable and strong financial positions and the 
proportion of the farm debt held by those classified as weak or severely 
stressed has declined. 
V. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FARM OPERATORS BY FINANCIAL POSITION 
The 1907 and 1908 surveys indicated a higher incidence of financial 
stress in Southern Iowa. While a pattern of regional differences 
appears to remain in the 1989 survey, the differences are not as 
apparent as in the 1988 survey. 
TABLE 7. Geographic Distribution of Iowa Farm Operators By Financial 
Position, January 1, 1989. 
MNANCIAL PUSl llUN 
CHARACTERISTICS (N) STRONG STABLE WEAK SEVERE TOTAL 
STATE TOTAL (723) 39 42 14 5 100 
Northwest (185) 43 41 12 4 lOO 
Central (191 ) 45 37 15 3 100 
Northeast (105) 32 48 16 4 100 
Southern (162) 37 42 15 6 100 
Source: 1909 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
VI. FINANCIAL INDICATORS BY FINANCIAL POSITION 
A major purpose of the Farm Finance Survey is to annually provide 
standard financial indicators by financial position that may be used as 
a tool or basis for comparison by farmers and others in making financial 
management and policy decisions. The 1989 Farm Finance Survey includes 
balance sheet, income statement and risk indicators by financial status. 
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TABLE 8. Comparison of Financial Characteristics For a Sample of Iowa 
Farm Operators by Financial Position, January 1, 1989. 
FINANCIAL 1989 FINANCIAL POSITION 1989 
CHARACTERISTICS STRONG STABLE WEAK SEVERE SAMPLE 
OPERATORS (*/.) 39 42 14 . 5 100 
Average Age 55 57 56 46 55 
Average Acres Operated 496 433 391 370 454 
BALANCE SHEET ($000) 
Total Assets 498 475 322 243 453 
Non-Real Estate 195 171 142 117 173 
Real Estate 303 304 180 126 280 
Total Debts 70 117 164 270 113 
Non-Real Estate 22 39 67 114 41 
Real Estate 48 78 97 156 72 
Net Worth 428 358 158 (27) 340 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT ($000) 
Gross Farm Income 164.2 121.8 104.8 105.5 140.2 
- Operating Expense 96.0 78.2 79.1 79.3 87.8 
- Interest Expense 7.1 11.3 14.7 17.3 10.5 
Net Cash Farm Income 61.1 32.3 11.0 8.9 41.9 
+ Inventory Change 3.4 0.6 6.9 1.7 2.4 
Ad.i Net Cash Farm Income 64.5 32.9 17.9 10.6 44.5 
- Depreciation 19.0 12.3 8.8 9.1 14.5 
NET FARM INCOME (bef tax) 45.5 20.6 9.1 1.5 30.0 
+ Off-Farm Income 14.9 8.5 8.5 9.8 11.3 
Income Before Taxes 60.4 29.1 17.6 11.3 41.3 
- Estimated Tax 16.3 7.0 3.4 4.7 10.9 
NET INCOME (aft tax) 44.1 22.1 14.2 6.6 30.4 
- Est. Family Living 16.2 15.8 16.5 17.4 16.0 
Earned Net Worth 27.9 6.3 (2.3) (10.8) 14.4 
+ Depreciation 19.0 12.3 8.8 9.1 14.5 
- Inventory Change 3.4 0.6 6.9 1.7 2.4 
NET CASH FLOW (aft tax) 43.5 18.0 (0.4) (3.4) 26.5 
FINANCIAL RISK INDICATORS (•/.) 
Debt/Asset Ratio 14.1 24.6 50.9 111.1 24.9 
Non-Real Est Assets/Debt 886 438 212 103 422 
Interest/Gross Income 4.3 9.3 14.0 16.4 7.5 
Return on Assets (bef int) 10.6 6.7 7.4 7.7 8.9 
Return on Equity (aft int) 10.6 5.8 5.8 ( ) 8.8 
Earned Net Worth Ratio 6.5 1.8 (1.5) ( ) 4.2 
Debt/Net Cash Flow Ratio 2 7 ( ) ( ) 4 
Source: 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
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VII. FARM OPERATOR CHARACTERISTICS BY FINANCIAL POSITION 
Several farm characteristics help to explain the differences in 
financial indicators across the various financial positions. Those with 
severe financial stress tend to be younger with more dependents and they 
rent a higher proportion of acres operated. They have higher living 
expenses, more education, and earn greater off-farm wages than farms in 
stable or weak position. Low 1989 returns for pork are also reflected 
in the enterprise mix indicators. 
TABLE 9. Operator Characteristics for a Sample of Iowa Farm Operators 
by Financial Position, Comparisons with 1909; 1988. 
OPERATOR FINANCIAL POSITION SAMPLE TOTAL 
CHARACTERISTICS STRONG STABLE WEAK SEVERE 1989 1980 
OPERATORS (%) 39 42 14 5 100 100 
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 
Average Age 55 57 56 46 55 54 
Years in Farming 31 33 32 21 32 30 
Total Dependents 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.8 2.8 2.9 
Dependents Under Age 18 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.6 0.7 0.0 
Husband Education * 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.3 2.4 
Wife Education * 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.5 
QEEzFARM INCOME 
Off-Farm Income ($000) 14.9 8.5 8.5 9.8 11.3 11.1 
Wage Income ($000) 10.1 5.8 7.0 9.3 7.9 7.6 
SOURCES OF GROSS FARM INCOME 
Crops 61 58 54 57 58 57 
Pork 17 15 18 S3 17 17 
Beef 15 19 17 18 17 16 
Dairy 3 2 5 0 3 4 
Other 4 __6 6 __2 § ——^ 
Total ÎÔ0 100 Too 100 100 Too 
LAND TENURE CHARACTERISTICS 
Total Acres Operated 496 432 391 369 454 463 
Acres Owned 255 281 183 150 258 254 
Percent Owning All Land 25 39 39 27 33 36 
Percent of Acres Rented 49 35 53 59 43 45 
Percent Renting All Land 14 9 14 17 12 13 
Jan. 1, 1989 Land Value/A 1188 1081 986 843 1087 974 
* Highest educational institution attended : 1 = grade school, 2 = high 
school, and 3 = college or vocational school. 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1989; 1988. 
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VIII. FINANCIAL INDICATORS BY AGE OF IOWA FARM OPERATORS 
Although farmers in all age groups can and have experienced 
financial stress, higher proportions of younger farmers have tended to 
experience financial stress during the 1980s. The financial 
characteristics of Iowa farmers by age groups provides an interesting 
analysis of farm income capabilities by age during 1987. 
First, net worth typically tends to grow until age 65 as retirement 
is phased in. Second, peak income years occur between the age of 35 and 
64. Third, farmers between the age of 35 to 44 tend to have the highest 
debt level. Return on assets and return on equity are highest for 
respondents who are less than 45 years old. Finally, the debt to cash 
flow ratios are higher for younger age groups. 
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TABLE 10. Comparison of Financial Characteristics For a Sample of Iowa 
Farm Operators by Age of Farm Operator, January 1, 1989. 
FINANCIAL .FARM OPERATOR AGE GROUPS 198" 
CHARACTERISTICS <"34" 35-44 45-54 55-64 > 65 SURVE 
OPERATORS (•/.) 4.0 14.8 24.5 38.2 18.5 100 
Average Age 32 40 50 60 70 55 
. Average Acres Operated 413 553 481 478 302 454 
BALANCE SHEET ($000) 
Total Assets 265 412 501 511 354 453 
Non-Real Estate 178 216 202 182 92 173 
Real Estate 87 196 299 329 262 280 
Total Debts 108 178 130 118 36 113 
Non-Real Estate 56 71 50 37 12 41 
Real Estate 52 107 80 81 24 72 
Net Worth 157 234 371 393 318 340 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT ($000) 
Gross Farm Income 128.4 181.6 146.4 156.2 71.1 140.2 
- Operating Expense 89.7 119.9 93.3 93.0 45.4 87.8 
- Interest Expense 8.8 13.5 11.7 12.3 3.7 10.5 
Net Cash Farm Income 29.9 48.2 41.4 50.9 22.0 41.9 
+ Inventory Change 3.8 7.1 4.1 2.3 (2.5) 2.4 
Adj Net Cash Farm Income 33.7 55.3 45.5 53.2 19.5 44.5 
- Depreciation 13.5 18.8 16.5 15.1 7.8 14.5 
NET FARM INCOME (bef tax) 20.2 36.5 29.0 38.1 11.7 30.0 
+ Off-Farm Income 11.1 11.5 11.4 11.0 11.6 11.3 
Income Before Taxes 31.3 48.0 40.4 49.1 23.3 41.3 
- Estimated Tax 6.7 10.4 10.3 14.0 6.4 10.9 
NET INCOME (aft tax) 24.6 27.6 30.1 35.1 16.9 30.4 
- Est. Family Living 17.7 17.9 16.5 15.5 15.4 16.0 
Earned Net Worth 6.9 9.7 13.6 19.6 1.5 14.4 
+ Depreciation 13.5 18.8 16.5 15.1 7.8 14.5 
- Inventory Change 3.8 7.1 4.1 2.3 (2.5) 2.4 
NET CASH FLOW (aft tax) 16.6 21.4 26.0 32.4 11.8 26.5 
FINANCIAL RISK INDICATORS (•/.) 
Debt/Asset Ratio 40.8 43.2 25.9 23.1 10.2 24.9 
Non-Real Est Assets/Debt 318 304 404 492 767 422 
Interest/Gross Income 6.9 7.4 8.0 7.9 5.2 7.5 
Ret. on Assets (bef int) 10.9 12.1 8.1 9.9 4.4 8.9 
Ret. on Equity (aft int) 12.9 15.6 7.8 9.7 3.7 8.8 
Earned Net Worth Ratio 4.4 4.1 3.7 5.0 0.5 4.2 
Debt/Net Cash Flow Ratio 7 8 5 4 3 4 
Source: 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
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IX. FINANCIAL INDICATORS BY SIZE OF FARM (ACRES) IN IOWA 
The financial indicators show that assets and net worth PER ACRE 
decline as acres operated increase. This is to be expected because 
larger farms rent more acres and spread their machinery costs over more 
acres. Thus, smaller farms utilize more investment per acre. 
Surprisingly, the range in net farm income is only a $28 per acre 
among the farm size groups. This indicates that no farm size group is 
significantly more profitable per acre than the other farm size groups. 
However, that is not the whole story. If we add off-farm income and 
subtract taxes and family living expenses, earned net worth and cash 
flow per acre are significantly less for the small farm group. Living 
expenses and taxes are spread over fewer acres in the small farm group. 
Even though many analysts argue over the presence of economies of 
size in farming, the more dramatic competitive effects are likely due to 
the shear differences in volume of production. Ignoring variation in 
profits per acre, the net farm income per farm for the small farms 
average $7,000 compared to $110,900 for the farms with over 1000 acres. 
Including off-farm income and deducting taxes, we also find that aftei— 
tax income is $13,800 for small farms and $85,700 for the large farms. 
Three important risk indicators significantly increase as farm size 
increases: earned net worth, return on assets and return on equity. 
Earned net worth is net income after family living expense which is 
available for principal payments and net investments above depreciation. 
The results indicate that while production economies per acre are 
similar across farm size groups, the financial competitiveness of the 
large farms can clearly overshadow the whole farm competitiveness of the 
small farms. Similar conclusions were found in the 1988 survey. 
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TABLE il. Comparison of Financial Characteristics PER ACRE For a 
Sample of Iowa Farm Operators by Farm Size (Acres), January 1, 1989. 
FINANCIAL FARM SIZE GROUPS (ACRES) 1989 
CHARACTER IS I ICS < 179 180-499 500-999 > 1000 SURVEY 
yPERATQRS (%) 16.3 50.4 26.5 6.8 100 
Average Age 61 55 53 52 54 
Average Acres 123 322 679 1308 454 
BALANCE SHEET ($/A) 
lotal Assets 1593 1093 954 818 991 
Non-Real Estate 479 404 387 333 377 
Real Estate 1114 689 567 485 614 
Total Debts 187 220 268 282 244 
Non-Real Estate 65 77 99 106 88 
Real Estate 122 143 169 176 156 
Net Worth 1406 873 686 536 747 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT ($/A) 
Gross Farm Income 311 322 288 339 306 
- Operating Expense 203 202 182 206 192 
- Interest Expense 18 20 24 28 23 
Net Cash Farm Income 90 100 82 105 91 
+ Inventory Change (3) (1) 10 9 5 
Adj Net Cash Farm Income 87 99 92 114 96 
- Depreciation 30 32 33 30 31 
NET FARM INCOME (bef tax) 57 67 59 85 65 
+ Off-Farm Income 87 34 16 11 24 
Income Before Taxes 144 101 75 96 89 
- Estimated Tax 32 26 19 30 24 
NET INCOME (aft tax) 112 75 56 66 65 
- Est. Family Living 128 50 24 13 35 
Earned Net Worth ( 16) 25 32 53 30 
+ Depreciation 30 32 33 30 31 
- Inventory Change (3) (1) 10 9 5 
NET CASH FLOW (aft tax) 17 58 55 74 56 
Source: 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
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TABLE IS. Comparison of Financial Characteristics For a Sample of Iowa 
Farm Operators by Farm Size (Acres), January 1, 1989. 
FINANCIAL FARM SIZE GROUPS (ACRES) 1989 
CHARACTERISTICS < 179 180-499 500-999 > 1000 SURVE' 
OPEWyrORS ('/.) 16.3 50.4 26.5 6.8 100 
Average Age 61 55 53 52 55 
Average Acres 123 322 679 1308 454 
BALANCE SHEET ($000) 
Total Assets 196 352 648 1070 453 
Non-Real Estate 59 130 263 435 173 
Real Estate 137 222 385 635 280 
Total Debts 23 71 182 369 113 
Non-Real Estate 8 25 67 139 41 
Real Estate 15 46 115 230 72 
Net Worth 173 280 466 701 340 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT ($000) 
Gross Farm Income 38.3 103.7 195.5 442.9 140.2 
- Operating Expense 24.9 65.2 123.4 269.0 87.8 
- Interest Expense 2.3 6.5 16.6 36.4 10.5 
Net Cash Farm Income 11.1 32.0 55.5 137.5 41.9 
+ Inventory Change (0.4) (0.2) 7.2 12.3 2.4 
Ad,i Net Cash Farm Income 10.7 31.8 62.7 149.6 44.5 
- Depreciation 3.7 10.4 22.7 38.9 14.5 
NET FARM INCOME (bef tax) 7.0 21.4 40.0 110.9 30.0 
+ Off-Farm Income 10.7 11.0 10.6 14.1 11.3 
Income Before Taxes 17.8 32.4 50.6 125.0 41.3 
- Estimated Tax 4.0 8.4 12.6 39.3 10.9 
NET INCOME (aft tax) 13.8 24.0 38.0 85.7 30. A 
- Est. Family Living 15.8 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.0 
Earned Net Worth (2.0) 7.9 21.6 69.1 14.4 
+ Depreciation 3.7 10.4 22.7 38.9 14.5 
- Inventory Change (0.4) (0.2) 7.2 12.3 2.4 
NET CASH FLOW (aft tax) 1.3 18.5 37.1 95.7 16.5 
FINANCIAL RISK INDICATORS (•/.) 
Debt/Asset Ratio 11.7 20.2 28.1 34.5 24.9 
Non-Real Est Assets/Debt 737 520 393 312 422 
Interest/Gross Income 6.0 6.3 8.5 8.2 7.5 
Return on Assets (bef int) 4.7 7.9 8.7 13.8 8.9 
Return on Equity (aft int) 4.0 7.6 8.6 15.8 8.8 
Earned Net Worth Ratio (1.1) 2.8 4.6 9.9 4.2 
Debt/Net Cash Flow Ratio 18 4 2 4 4 
Source: 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
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X. CHANfah IN FARM DEBT BY DEBT POSITION 
The IVBV Faim Finance burvey asked respondents for Januai v I. 1V88 
i^nii IVH'y limianre sheet data. Ihis allows direct i-omparisun i>|- the 
changes in debt level that nrcuited dui ing the IVtiti i_aIpndai yeai . 
While most producers remained in the same debt class dui inu IVHb. 12 
percent at the 752 respondents show a reduction in their IVtiV tieht *:lass 
level compared to 1988. Un the uther hand, 6 percent of the respondents 
show a higher debt class in IVUV compared to 1988. 
I he r i se in debt to asset ratios for those witii higher iJebt levels 
may indicate an eroding financial position. However . those with rising 
debt ratios and lower debt levels may be incurring more debt as they 
purchase real estate and/or expand operations. 
lAULt 13. Charrge in Debt to Asset Ffatio Classes For the 1989 Farm 
Finance butvey Sample of Iowa Farm Uperators: January 1. 1989 and 1988. 
1988 Debt/ 
Asset Ratio 
L1ass (%) O 10*/. 
1989 Debt/Asset 
i0-40% 40-/0% 
Ratio Class 
70 100% Insolvent 
1988 
Intal 
Uist. 
o io% 92% 7% 1% 0% o% 4b% 
10-40V4 13 b 29 
4U-V()% 2 23 Zi 3 I 17 
7o-iooy. 4 2 45 42 O 6 
Insolvent h 19 76 3 
1989 Total 
Distribution 46% 31% 17% 4% 2% ioo% 
( ) The number underlined indicates the percentage of operators in 
this 1988 debt class who are in the same debt class in 1989. 
bXAMPLb: Uf the respondents who had a O-IO percent debt to asset ratio 
January 1, 1988, 92 percent had O-IO percent debt to asset ratios 
on January 1, 1989, while ratios for V percent rose to the lO 40 
per cent level and ratios for 1 percent r ose above 40 percent. 
Source: 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
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XI. FARM DEBT BY FINANCIAL POSITION HELD BY EACH LENDER 
Generally, the distribution of farm debt by borrower's financial 
position appeared to be mixed for the lenders during 1989. The portfolio 
of farm debt by financial position appeared to weaken slightly for 
banks. However, the distribution of debt appears to improve for the Farm 
Credit System and the FmHA. 
TABLE 14. Distribution of Farm Debt by Lender and Financial Position 
A Comparison of 1989 and 1988 Farm Finance Surveys. 
FINANCIAL POSITION TOTAL 
LENDERS (N> STRONG STABLE WEAK SEVERE SAMPLE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
January 1, 1989 (344) S3 41 23 13 100 
January 1, 1988 33 34 22 11 100 
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
January I,"l9a9 (148) 14 56 22 8 100 
January 1, 1988 26 32 28 14 100 
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION . 
January 1, 1989 (83) 3 39 32 26 100 
January 1, 1988 5 27 38 30 100 
INSURANCE COMPANIES 
January 1, 1989 (69) 20 44 24 12 100 
January 1, 1988 NA NA NA NA 100 
INDIVIDUALS 
January 1, 1989 (231) 21 40 23 16 100 
January 1, 1988 27 35 24 14 100 
QIHERS 
January 1, 1989 (153) 19 46 22 14 100 
January 1, 1988 27 37 28 8 100 
IQÎAL SAMPLE 
January 1, 1989 (505) 24 43 21 12 100 
January 1, 1988 25 35 25 15 100 
NA - Not Available, inconsistencies in data prevent publication. 
Sources: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1989; 1988. 
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XII. DISTRIBUTION OF FARM FINANCIAL STRESS AMONG LENDERS 
Based on the 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey, the banks presently 
hold the largest portion (34 percent) of the farm debt that is 
classified as severely stressed. The Farmers Home Administration holds 
24 percent. Individuals and the Farm Credit System hold 17 percent and 
13 percent, respectively. 
Private banks also hold the largest portion (43 percent) of farm 
debt borrowed by farmers with a strong financial position. Individuals 
hold 27 percent of this debt. The Farm Credit System holds 13 percent. 
As expected, the debt indicators by borrowers' financial position 
for the Farmers Home Administration reflect FmHA's role as a government 
"lender of last resort." The percentages of debt by financial status 
increase as the financial stress increases. 
TABLE 15. Distribution of Farm Debt Across Lenders by Financial 
Position For a Sample of Iowa Farm Operators, Comparisons 1989. 
FINANCIAL POSITION TOTAL 
LENDERS STRONG STABLE WEAK SEVERE SAMPLE 
ÇQMMERÇIAL BANKS 43 29 26 34 35 
FARN CREDIT SYSTEM 13 29 22 13 21 
FARMERS HOME ADMIN 2 10 18 24 11 
INSURANCE COMPANIES 7 6 3 5 5 
INDIVIDUALS 27 18 23 17 20 
QIHERS 8 8 8 7 8 
IQIAL SAMPLE 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: 1989 Iowa Farm Finance Survey. 
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XIII. SELECTED FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
In spite of improved financial conditions during 1988, 9.2 percent 
of those seeking operating credit expect difficulty in receiving credit. 
This is down from 11.0 percent in 1988 and 14.6 percent in 1987. 
While only 6.5 percent of the respondents sold land during the past 
three years, 32.5 percent of those who sold land claimed that they did 
so due in part to financial stress. And, similar to 1988 and 1987 
responses, there are more than twice as many respondents who sold 
equipment or breeding stock due to financial stress than who sold land 
due to financial stress. 
Finally, between 2.5 and 8 percent of the respondents indicate 
renegotiation of land contracts, principal and interest write-down and 
FmHA loan guarantees during the last three years. These responses are 
similar to those in 1988 and 1987. 
TABLE 16. Comparisons of Iowa Farm Finance Practices, 1989: 1988, 1987. 
SURVEY QUESTION PERCENT YES RESPONSES 1989 1988 1987 
a. Will you seek operating credit during this year? 42.8% 38.8% 42.4% 
b. If yes, do you expect difficulty acquiring credit? 9.2 11.0 14.6 
c. If you have not declared bankruptcy, are you 
contemplating bankruptcy in the future? 0.7 2.6 4.2 
d. During the last 3 years, have you sold land? 6.5 5.3 5.1 
e. 11 yes, was this sale due to financial stress? 32.5 55.6 57.7 
f. During the last 3 years, have you sold equipment 
or breeding livestock? 29.4 31.6 35.1 
g. If yes, was this sale due to financial stress? 21.4 21.7 27.7 
During the last 3 years : 
h. Have you given back land purchased on contract? 2. 9 3. 0 3.0 
i . Have you renegotiated a land contract? 7. 7 7. 1 6.9 
j - Have you voluntarily turned assets back to lender? 2. 5 3. 2 • 3.5 
U. Have you received a write-down in principal owed? 4. 1 4 . 3 4.6 
1. Have you received a write-down in interest owed? 5. 2 5. 6 6.8 
fn a Have you received a FmHA loan guarantee? 6. 3 6. 0 6.2 
Source: Icwa Farm Finance Survey, 1989; 1988; and 1987. 
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XIV. MARKETING AND RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF IOWA FARM OPERATORS 
Similar to the 1988 Farm Finance Survey, the 1989 Survey asked 
questions about the marketing management strategies of Iowa farmers. 
Ihe impacts of the drought and alleged wrong doing by some commodity 
exchanges appear to have influenced 1989 farmer preferences on the use 
of futures. On the other hand, the use of options continues to grow. 
Many respondents showed interest in forward contracting insurance 
which could be used to limit contract penalties from a short crop. In 
the 1988 survey, 39.4 percent of farmers who forward contracted crops 
would consider using this insurance product. In 1989, 55.9 percent of 
those who forward contracted crops would consider using such a product. 
Forward contracting insurance has been introduced in other states, but 
not Iowa. This survey indicates a viable market may potentially exist. 
TABLE 17. Marketing Management Practices of Iowa Farmers, 1989; 1988. 
1. Which of the following market tools Grain Hogs Fed Cat 
have you used during the last 2 yearsV 1989 1988 1989 1988 1989 1988 
a. Cash marketing or government loans 54.0 42.3 77.0 71.2 78.4 80.1 
b. Forward cash contracts 40.3 41.2 7.4 11.4 6.3 3.6 
c. Futures market for hedging 12.2 11.2 15-3 17.8 14.2 15.7 
f- Agricultural commodity options 12.4 11.5 9.8 7.8 1 0 .  a 8.4 
£. Identify the most important factors Very Somewhat No t a 
why you would not use forward Important Important Factor 
marketing tools? 1989 1988 1989 1988 1989 1988 
a. Conditions favor other strategies 22.3 31.6 47.5 36.3 30.2 32.1 
b. Fear or lack of knowledge 27.1 23.2 35.4 30.3 37.5 46.5 
c. Fear of bad weather and short crop 56.8 N.A. 32.8 N.A. 10.4 N.A. 
d. Too much speculation and manipulation 52.5 42.1 27.9 25.9 19.6 32.0 
e. Morally wrong to use such tools 8.6 5.3 10.9 6.9 80.5 87.8 
3. Would you consider forward pricing a larger portion of your sales if 
insurance was available to limit losses during a short crop? 
38.8% Yes 30.6% No 30.6% Do Not forward Price Crops. 
Source : Iowa Farm Finance Survey 1989 ; 1988. 
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XV. FARM PROGRAM IMPACTS. 
Nearly 90 percent of the survey respondents indicated participation 
in government farm programs. The respondents estimated government 
payments to represent 17.9 percent of their gross farm income. Based 
on the 1989 Farm Finance Survey financial summary data, farm program 
payments represented 83.8 percent of 1989 net farm income. The percent 
of net farm income is higher than expected based on other sources. 
TABLE 18. Farm Program Impacts on Iowa Farm Operators, 1989. 
I tern Percent 
a. Farm Program Participation 89.3 * 
b. Estimated Payments /Gross Farm Income 17.9 * 
c. Estimated Payments /Net Farm Income 83.8 ** 
* Direct survey response. 
** Compiled from item "b" and survey financial data. 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1989. 
XVI. DISASTER ASSISTANCE AND CROP INSURANCE POLICY PREFERENCES 
The 1989 Farm Finance Survey included a number of questions 
regarding the impacts of the drought, crop insurance and the 1988 
Disaster Assistance Act. The results show a significant increase in the 
purchase of multiple peril crop insurance for corn and soybeans in 1989 
compared to 1988. In addition, some farmers shifted their coverage from 
private hail and fire to multiple peril coverage. 
Nearly half of the respondents received (or expected to receive) 
forgiveness of deficiency payments and crop disaster assistance 
payments. Less than five percent received livestock feed assistance. 
More than one in five received (or expected to receive) crop insurance 
indemnity payments for 1988 drought losses. 
The passage of the 1988 Disaster Assistance Act has apparently not 
adversely affected farmers' attitudes towards the purchase of multiple 
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peril crop insurance as had previously been suggested. In fact, 22.6 
percent of the respondents will buy more crop insurance as a result of 
the drought. Less than one percent indicated that they would buy less 
crop insurance due to the 1988 Drought Assistance Act. 
By a two-to-one margin, the repondents favor having voluntary 
multiple peril crop insurance as the only disaster relief during drought 
years. However, respondents were more evenly split as to whether the 
government should provide disaster assistance in place of crop 
insurance. The respondents also were evenly split as to whether they 
thought the government would pass another drought assistance act if 
another drought occurs in 1989. 
Farmers favor mandatory purchase of crop insurance for FmHA 
borrowers. Since FmHA accounts for only 11 percent of the farm debt, 
most of those who favor this requirement are not FmHA borrowers. On the 
other hand, 89 percent of the respondents participated in government 
payments, but the respondents were opposed to requiring mandatory crop 
insurance for farm program participants by a two—to—one margin. 
When asked about the provisions of the 1988 Disaster Assistance 
Act, nearly two-thirds of the respondents believed the minimum losses 
required to qualify for assistance and payment rates were about right. 
Twenty—three percent of the respondents are required to purchase 
crop insurance in 1989 due to the provisions of the 1988 Disaster 
Assistance Act. Over half of the respondents believed that farmers who 
purchased crop insurance should be allowed to be eligible for both crop 
insurance and disaster assistance if another Act is subsequently passed 
after the purchase in the future. 
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TABLE 19. Disaster Assistance and Crop Insurance Strategies, 1989. 
A. Crop Insurance Purchases Corn Soybeans Neither 
Did you (will you) buy 1989 1988 1989 1988 1989 1988 
— — — —— • ' — ( % ) —— ( % ) —— ——— ( % ) 
Multiple peril crop insurance? 58.8 34.4 42.6 26.4 39.6 64.0 
Private hail/fire crop insurance? 42.4 44.9 40.4 42.4 52.3 50.2 
B. 1988 Disaster and Crop Insurance Receipts Percent Avg Payrot/ 
Did you (or do you expect to) receive Claimant 
Disaster forgiveness of Deficiency Payments? 47.1% $2415 
Drought Assistance Act Crop Disaster Assistance? 49.4 6597 
Livestock Feed Assistance Payments? 4.7 5593 
Payments from 1988 Multiple Peril Crop Insurance? 22.3 8498 
C. Has the 1988 Drought Assistance Act affected 1989 crop insurance 
decisions? Not Applicable 11.4% Percent 
I will buy more crop insurance in 1989 as a result. 22.6% 
I will buy less crop insurance in 1989 as a result. 0.2 
No, it will not affect my crop insurance decisions. 65.7 
D. If another severe drought occurs in 1989, how likely is the 
government to pass another Drought Assistance Act? 
Very Likely 16.5% Very Unlikely 16.2% Not Sure 28.0% 
Somewhat Likely 22.3% Somewhat Unlikely 17.1% 
E. What should be our national policy to deal with Not 
farm production risks and natural disasters? Agree Sure Disagree 
Voluntary multiple peril crop insurance should be (percent) 
the only disaster relief during drought years. 45.8 30.1 24.1 
Government should provide disaster assistance for 
a severe disaster in place of crop ' insurance. 31.3 33.2 35.5 
Multiple peril crop insurance should be required 
for farmers receiving FmHA loans. 70.7 17.7 11.6 
Multiple peril crop insurance should be required 
for all farm program participants. 24.3 26.7 49.1 
F. What do you think about the provisions of Too About Too Not 
the 1988 Disaster Assistance Act? High Right Low Sure 
Minimum losses to receive assistance were: 11.6% 65.0% 10.8% 12.5% 
The payment rates for corn were: 8.1 67.2 12.6 12.1 
G. Crop Insurance Requirements and Eligiblility Yes No Not 
Sure-
Should farmers with crop insurance be eligible 
for both crop insurance and disaster assistance? 56.6% 30.6% 12.7% 
Are you required to buy multiple peril crop 
insurance due to 1988 Disaster Assistance Act? 23.2% 76.8% -
Source. Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1989. 
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